

УДК: 930.1/94:355+327.5(430+450) «1938/1945»

DOI: 10.24411/2311-1763-2020-10264

Поступила в редакцию: 14.09.2020 г.

Submitted: September 14, 2020

Опубликована: 30.11.2020 г.

Published online: November 30, 2020

Для цитирования: Irene Guerrini, Marco Pluviano. 1943-1945: Italian enforced laborers in Germany. Men and women forced to support German military efforts. *Наука. Общество. Оборона*. Москва. 2020;8(4):40-40. DOI: 10.24411/2311-1763-2020-10264.

For citation: Irene Guerrini, Marco Pluviano. 1943-1945: Italian enforced laborers in Germany. Men and women forced to support German military efforts. *Nauka. Obščestvo. Oborona = Science. Society. Defense*. Moscow. 2020;8(4):40-40. DOI: 10.24411/2311-1763-2020-10264.

Конфликт интересов: О конфликте интересов, связанном с этой статьей, не сообщалось.

Conflict of Interest: No conflict of interest related to this article has been reported.

OBJECTIVE HISTORY

Conference materials

1943-1945: Italian enforced laborers in Germany. Men and women forced to support German military efforts

Irene Guerrini ¹, Marco Pluviano ²

¹ *University of Genoa, Genoa, Liguria, Italy,*

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8495-5151>, e-mail: irene.guerrini@giuri.unige.it

² *Regional Institute for the history of the Resistance movement and the Contemporary age,
Genoa, Liguria, Italy,*

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9652-9499>, e-mail: m.pluviano@alice.it

Abstract:

Italians experienced migration to Germany well before WWI, and from 1938 to 1943. After 8 of September 1943 Nazi Germany wanted more and more workers from Italy, but Italians disliked going to work voluntarily in Germany. So, Germans and the puppet RSI government begun to organize mops up of anti Fascists, people in strike, unemployed men and women, and draft dodgers. More than 100.000 Italians were dispatched to German factories, farms and building yards, mainly forcibly. Also 500.000 Italian soldiers captured by Nazi on 8 of September 1943, 100.000 workers obliged to remain in Germany after the Armistice and some thousands of Italian migrants from other European countries became enforced laborers for the German war effort. All of them experienced violence, harsh discipline, hunger and cold. Many of the Italians were sent by the Germans to concentration camps as political prisoners, where their mortality rate was 45%. Italians became the fourth largest group of forced laborers in Germany after the Soviet, Polish and French people. After June 1944, Italy became the main source of human resources for forced labor in the Reich. Materials of the International scientific conference "75 years of Victory: the Soviet Union and the end of World War II in the Far East" (Moscow, Russian Federation, September 3, 2020).

Keywords:

enforced laborers, Italian Fascism, Repubblica Sociale Italiana, German occupation in Italy, strikes during WWII

INTRODUCTION

This report is a short summary of a much more large research about Italian enforced laborers (1), directed by professor Brunello Mantelli and sponsored by the National Association of the former War prisoners (ANRP), the Foundation Memory for the future, and the Foundation Memory of the deportation, with the economic support of German Federal Republic's Ministry of the Foreign Affairs. This is a work in progress project, and the researches are continuing to produce books, reports to conferences, and essays [9] (2).

We have to take in count long lasting relationships between Italian and German areas, to explain the history of Italian job in Germany. Italy had strong links with German lands from the ancient times, beginning during Roman Empire and continuing all along Middle Age and Renaissance. Sometimes, they were not so good, specially during the rule of the House of Hapsburg. Since the half of XVII century the Hapsburg led Holy Roman German Empire had an increasing role in Italy. Since 1706 (Spanish succession war), the rich Duchy of Milan became part of the Hapsburg's empire. At the end of the Napoleonic wars Austrians became the direct, and partly indirect, rulers of large parts of northern and central Italy. So, Hapsburg government was the main enemy of Italian Risorgimento movement (1830-1870).

This enmity remained well established in the Italian public opinion all along XIX century, until the WWI, and it was one of the main tool used by interventionist movement to drag Italy in the World War on the side of the *Entente* in 1915.

But, Germany was not the same things. Indeed, Italy had a totally different approach towards Prussia and the Prussians led Germany, at least during XIX century. Rather, Italy was allied with Prussia against Hapsburg during the Austro-Prussian war in 1866 (for Italy, it was the Third Independence war).

During the Sixties of XIX century the relationships between Italy and its greatest supporter during Risorgimento, France, dramatically worsened. After 1870, when French emperor Napoleon III was defeated by Prussia, Rome and Berlin developed a real strategic relationship. Italian society and culture were deeply divided: on one side, liberal and democratic milieus were pro France; on the other, conservative, nationalist and militarist environments supported an alliance with the newborn German Empire. Since 1887 until 1896, nationalist and rightist Italian Prime Minister Francesco Crispi liked to be considered as "the Italian Bismarck".

So, Italian economy, finance and industry were strongly influenced by Germany, and many German and German speaking (Swiss, specially) capitalists begun to establish factories and financial houses in Italy. German capitalism, and the British one also, were the first sponsors of the birth of Italian industry. But, not only financial and industrial *elites* were pro German: scientists, philosophers, and lawyers were often linked with German academic world. Italian *elite* sent his sons to study part to Paris, and part to Zurich or in the main German universities. So, the links between the two Countries became more and more stronger.

Italians speaking people migrated towards German lands long time before the contemporary age, and during the last decades of XIX century they established important communities in the main industrial cities in Germany, and in lesser proportion in the Hapsburg Empire. Many people from the northern areas (Lombardy, Veneto, Friuli) went to Austria and Germany both before and after the birth of the unified Kingdom of Italy (1860) and the annexation of the north eastern provinces (1866). There was both a seasonal, and durable migration.

Obviously, WWI and the following German economic crisis stopped migration but, when Weimar economy was stabilized Italians begun again to travel towards German lands, specially from north eastern areas. Also, some antifascists chose to go to the democratic Weimar republic.

LABOR MIGRATION OF ITALIANS TO GERMANY IN 1938-1943

Until Hitler's rise to the power in 1933, Fascist Italy disliked Italian migration towards liberal Germany but, after NSDAP's taking power Mussolini begun to send again workers to Germany, well before the outbreak of WWII. From the beginning of 1938 to July 1943 around 500.000 Italian men and women went to work in German farms, building yards, factories, and houses.

The first wave of migrant workers was composed by peasants, mainly from the Italian poorest regions. Nazi Germany preferred men, and women, from northern Italy, but Fascist government quickly begun to dispatch people from central and southern areas, also. Fascist Party and Unions organized political rallies when trains with migrant left for Germany; they always tried to magnify this new kind of migration protected by Fascist government, opposing it to the pre Fascist "beggars' migration" ignored by the previous liberal governments.

Migration of unemployed workers and peasants towards Germany was a powerful tool to obtain consent for Fascism in the poorest areas and to strengthen personal power and prestige for local and national Fascist leaders, the so-called *ras* (18). For instance, both Achille Starace (3) in Puglia and Roberto Farinacci (4) in Cremona (a former pro Socialist rural area in Lombardy) obtained to send to Germany a great number of their fellow countrymen, usually poor trained and unskilled rural laborers.

Fascist and Nazi governments subscribed a good number of agreements, and this migration became more and more important and convenient for both. Italy was able to reduce the rate of unemployment, above all in the poorest rural areas, and to straighten its balance of payment (5); and Germany received industrial and rural working force to use when and where needed (6). After the outbreak of the war, Italian migrants became more and more useful to substitute the enlisted German men and to reduce the feminine working force (Nazi ideological patterns preferred that married women remained in their "traditional" roles: wives, mothers, housekeepers. At the most, nurses or farmers).

At the beginning, Italians were satisfied to go to Germany to work, especially in the factories: higher wages, better welfare. But, problems quickly began to rise: Italians' difficulties to accept German foods; Germans' dislike for love affairs between Italian men and German women (specially the wives of soldiers); Italians' difficulties to learn German language; Germans' dislike for Italian migrants' poor industrial competences (7).

Furthermore, German government tried to reduce the amount of money that Italians could send home with the remittances, because it did not want that a large flow of German currency had been spent out of Germany: German money had only to be used to buy German goods. It was a very sensitive subject for Italian workers: they raised a lot of protests, because they traveled so far mainly to be able to send money to their families. Remittances were diplomatic and economic problems all along the Italian migration experience: Italian and German governments continued to discuss about the monthly amount of money allowed to be sent home. German authorities were able to insert migrants' cash remittances in the system of clearing, that ruled the commercial relationships between Italy and Germany. In this way, Germany avoided to send its currency abroad, and was able to use migrants' remittances to balance its shopping of Italian rough materials, agricultural products, semi-finished industrial products. Italian workers paid money to German banks or Post office, and their families received money from Italian government, via the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). During the second half of 1942, German authorities allowed Italian migrants to send home money without limits, both to reduce their purchase of consumer goods (they begun to be in short supply, and Nazi wanted to keep them for Germans), and to overcome Italian workers' hesitation to migrate to Germany (8). So, Germany imported workforce and exported inflation.

But, when Allied air raids begun to strike more and more with deadly bombings German cities and industrial areas, many Italian workers tried to fly to the motherland before the end of their employment contracts without regards for German authorities' permission (9). Besides, after the first months of 1942 Fascist regime begun to dislike this flow of young men towards Germany because it needed both industrial workers for its war factories, and soldiers for its poor equipped and trained Army weakened by the heavy losses due to the frequent defeats (10).

Anyway, until summer 1943 Italians continued to enjoy better treatment than people from vanquished Countries or Prisoners of War, in Germany. During the war Italy became more and more a junior partner in the Axis, but it remained the strongest ally of Nazi Germany in Europe, and Italian workers in Germany had the same treatment than German ones, at least in theory. They were engaged to work in the most sensitive factory and jobs (industrial plants building sites, weapon factories, etc.).

ATMISSION BY THE ITALIANS OF THE "SHAME OF TRAITING"

Everything begun to change after Mussolini's fall by the government, on 25 of July 1943, and the situation was totally overthrown after Armistice, on 8 of September 1943. In 45 days, Italy's status totally changed: from main ally to occupied Country, with a quisling, or puppet, governments (11). Obviously, this change had tragic consequences for Italian workers in Germany: they lost their partly privileged status and quickly became the target for Germans' long standing racial and political prejudices. At the end of July 1943 little more than 100.000 Italians worked in Germany and almost all of them did not receive the permission to come back to Italy for the next 21 months. Moreover, Germans suspended until March 1944 the economic clearing that also regulated migrants' remittances. The stoppage of the flow of money towards Italy had very harsh consequences for migrated workers' families because they lost any kind of economic support and were plunged into poverty. This suspension created a wide discontent among Italian workers in Germany and, moreover, it was one of the main arguments used by anti Fascist movements to campaign against recruitment of workers to be dispatched to Germany. The newborn neo Fascist RSI was not able to force Germany to quickly restore the system of clearing, and its prestige suffered a harsh blow among Italian people. Remittances started again seven months later, but they never come back to be reliable and efficient (12), both for RSI's inefficiency and disorganization, and for German predatory attitude. Furthermore, railways, post and road communications between Germany and Italy became more and more difficult all along the duration of RSI.

Fascist republican government wasn't able to efficiently help families because it gave them inadequate and delayed subventions due to RSI finance and economy's very harsh difficulties (heavy war contributions paid to Germany, industrial crisis, unemployment, devaluation and inflation, shortage of food and fuel). RSI begun to pay some subsidies in the second half of October 1943 (13) but they were very poor, and only supported workers obliged to remain in Germany after July 1943. RSI was not able, or maybe did not want, to support people dispatched to Germany since September 1943 until March 1944 (usually unwillingly and forcibly), when clearing begun to operate again.

But, Nazi leadership developed much more ambitious aims. Immediately after Armistice, some prominent Nazi leaders declared that Italians were much more useful as workers in Germany, than as soldiers at the front lines. Hitler planned to take at least 1,5 million of Italians. Neo Fascist government was not able to make any effective opposition against German wills. Part of its leadership (Republican Fascist Party – PFR - and the Fascist Unions – CFLI - mainly) enthusiastically supported any German project, while part of government, bureaucratic and industrial leaderships tried to preserve Italian industrial system. They were able to ally themselves with the so called *Rustungskommando*, RuK, German representatives in Italy of Albert Speer's Ministry for weapons and ammunitions, with the aim to maintain part of the war industry production for Germany in Italy. German Ruk supported this idea both to maintain peace in the Country, and to decentralize production to minimize effects of bombings against German industrial areas.

During the winter 1943-1944 Germans and RSI government tried to obtain a massive voluntary adhesion to the workers' enlistment for Germany. They hoped the memory of recent migration to the *Reich*, and Italian very harsh economic conditions could stimulate both workers and unemployed men and women to go to Germany. Moreover, they tried to play the ideological card of military brotherhood, proposing the work in Germany as a contribution to the Axis's victory, on the same level of the military engagement. So, Fascists tried to make the work in Germany a moral and ideological duty useful to redeem the "shame of betrayal", as Fascist called the Armistice signed on 8 of September 1943.

But, they were not able to obtain the hoped goal: only few thousands of Italians voluntarily adhered to the calls during the first months. Many of them came from the poorest rural areas in northern Italy, but the vast majority of the targeted people refused to adhere.

Germans' and Fascists' reaction against Italian workers' change of mind about migration to Germany was very rough: refusal to the so-called *Servizio del lavoro in Germania* (Duty of the work in Germany) was equated to the draft evasion, and it could be punished with the death.

Why the powerful German propaganda machine and the twenty years old Fascist consensus organizations failed to obtain at least a partial voluntary adhesion, or the obedience to the enlistments and to the injunctions? There were many reasons: Italians were tired of war, and the military defeats of 1943 had weakened Fascism and Mussolini's authority; people from central and southern parts of the Country feared to be cut out from home for the quick Allied advance; the

news of terrible, terrorizing air bombings on German cities, and the advance of the Red Army in the East; the fear to be dispatched to fight, specially against the Red Army; the stoppage and difficulties suffered by remittances system; the possibility to work in Italy (usually in their native province) for RSI's *Ispettorato militare del lavoro* (Military inspectorate of the work), or for German Todt Organization, or for the *Wehrmacht*, directly. And, last but not the least, Italians clearly understood that German attitude towards them had changed, and not in better.

So, Germans quickly decided to apply a more compulsive approach. Since the days immediately following the Armistice in the southern regions (14), and in few weeks in the other areas, Italian cities and countryside suffered for a great number of roundups of working forces. Usually, when German troops had to retreat, they destroyed roads, bridges, railways, and factories too, and people were rounded up to be sent to the north, in Germany also.

Sometime, the mops up happened as retaliation against partisans' actions in the countryside, or during roundups against political opponents in the cities. Moreover, all people without valid documents, and all unemployed men were eligible to be sent to the enforced work in the *Reich*. But German authorities continued to try to dispatch to the *Reich* workers from factories with reduced working time, also.

From January to November 1944 Italian Police, German troops and SS, Fascist Party's armed militia (Black Shirts, from August 1944 Black Brigades) organized evening and night patrols to round up vagabonds, misfits, prostitutes, unemployed men, young absentees, but also political opponents, students. Time by time these roundups became more frequent, and they begun to be carried out also during the daytime hours against students, workers, women protesting against the food shortages, in the middle of terrorized crowds of citizens. In some cases, they made roundups in the air raids shelters, also. In Milan they took people during the Milan-Juventus football match (but it's not clear if they had been dispatched to Germany).

Moreover, thousands of men were dispatched to the enforced work in the deadly chemical plants from Italian prisons, after an agreement between RSI and German government.

The factories were the other main source of workers for the *Reich*, mainly during and after the strikes. Italy was the German occupied country that experienced the most powerful strikes, mainly from November 1943 to July 1944 [16]. They happened in the main industrial area, the so called "industrial triangle" encompassing the cities of Genoa, Milan and Turin, but also in the Emilian industrial cities of Bologna, Modena and Reggio Emilia, in Tuscany, and in Veneto. The most powerful strikes happened in December 1943 and on the 1st of March 1944, and this last was a powerful national strike with heavy anti German slogans. During every strike and in the following days there were mass roundups and single arrests, in the working places, in the streets, or at home. Many of them were sent in the concentration camps, as political prisoners and suffered a mortality rate of 45%, with local rate around 80%. Many others were sent at the enforced work. For instance, after the strike on 1st of March, in the great industrial cities of Milan and Turin thousands of men and women were arrested to be dispatched in the *Reich*, mainly in the *Konzentrationslager* of Mauthausen. But, also in minor industrial cities there were many arrests: for instance, in the city of Savona (in Liguria) and in the industrial minor towns of its province on 1st of March the strike had a very high adhesion: almost 200 men and women were arrested. Little more than 100 were dispatched to the enforced work, and 67 were deported to the concentration camps (only eight deportees came back home) (15). In Genoa there were some very successful strikes during the first ten days of June: around 20.000 workers suspended the work in the war factories. On 16 of June, there was a round up in the industrial area of Sestri Ponente, and 1.448 men were sent to the German factories [8].

NUMBER OF ITALIANS IN FORCED WORK AND THE CONDITIONS OF THEIR EXISTENCE

During the twenty months of RSI at least 100.000 Italians (85% of them were men) were dispatched to the *Reich* to work. They mainly went to the factories, but some of them were employed in the farms, in the public services (mainly postal service and railways), or as drivers, housekeepers, hotel and restaurant employees. Many of them changed their work due to the German needs; often, the workers were employed to clean streets and urban areas from debris and ruins after the air bombings, or were dispatched to build military lines of defence, especially from Austria to Hungary.

There were some volunteers, but the majority of the Italians dispatched to Germany were enforced workers. A part the victims of roundups and mass or individual arrests, many people were obliged by RSI's order of mobilization for the work

in Germany. They answered because the rejecting people were considered deserters and their families lost food coupons, parents could be arrested, and the absentees could be sentenced to death.

How many Italians were transformed in enforced workers for the German war economy? As we have shown, at least 100.000 workers were directly, and mainly forcibly, sent to the *Reich* from Italy. As we have written before, there were 100.000 men and women obliged to remain in Germany after September 1943. Thousands of Italian migrants were dispatched to the *Reich* directly from France, Belgium and Netherlands by German authorities or local collaborationists, and at least 500.000 Italian Military Internees (IMI) in Germany were sent to the forced work after August 1944 (16). In this way, Italians became the fourth larger groups of forced laborers after Soviet, Polish and French people [21], [22].

The enforced laborers experienced a very wide spectrum of conditions of life. Especially in the farms, some of them had a not so bad life. But the vast majority of them experienced very harsh discipline, physical violence from military and civilian Germans, humiliations, hunger, cold, very bad conditions of work, and very poor accommodation conditions. Some laborers were killed by factory policemen, or by civilians during the last days of war, and a number of them were sent in the German prisons or to concentration camps due to disciplinary problems or political subjects.

They had a mortality rate well below the political prisoners, and also the Italian Military Internee in Germany, but much higher than in the civil life. Many of them came back home with very important health problems, for instance tuberculosis and gastrointestinal diseases.

CONCLUSION

You can ask us: Why Germany decided to exploit in a so large way civilians from a former ally, where it was supporting the birth of a new, totally Fascist republic? The answer is in the increasingly dramatic military and industrial conditions experienced by Nazi Germany after the battle of Stalingrad [23]. On one side, the eastern basins of recruitment for mainly enforced workers were coming back in the hands of USSR. On the other, Germany needed even more working force to substitute the men enlisted in the desperate attempt to fill the enormous losses suffered by the Wehrmacht in the East. Finally, Germany needed a working force without any right, to be used in the very harsh and dangerous jobs: hide the aeronautical factories and rebuild the frequently bombed chemical plants, for instance. During the month of August 1944, more than 20% of the workers in the *Reich* were foreign workers, that is to say 5.700.000 on 28.800.000, and you have to add at least 1.900.000 PoW [23, p. 23-78]. After June 1944, Italy unfortunately became the main basin to feed the body of the enforced laborers.

Moreover, in this way Germany showed the kind of punishment would be imposed to any ally that tried to escape from her. About this aspect, forced work became part of the model of repression, besides with mass murders and deportation in the *Konzentrationslager* (17).

Footnotes

1. This research begun in 2007 and it is still continuing. See [1]. In the next years, some books about the enforced laborers from single regional areas will be published. The research team is also carrying out a data base with enforced laborers' names and all the available information. About Italian enforced laborers, see also [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], [8].
2. In December 2020 will be published a monographic issue of the journal "Critica sociologica", devoted to the Italian enforced laborers in Germany.
3. **Achille Starace** (1889-1945) was the National Secretary of National Fascist Party (PNF) from 1931 to 1939.
4. **Roberto Farinacci** (1892-1945) was National Secretary of PNF from January 1925 to March 1926. He was the leader of the so called "intransigents", the most violent and extreme part of PNF, and had an important role during the neo Fascist Repubblica Sociale Italiana (RSI).
5. Italy was heavily dependent on the German economy, importing technologies, industrial plants and goods, weapons, iron, and coal. Its balance of payment with Germany was deeply negative.
6. About Italian migration to Germany between 1938 and 1943 see: [10], [11].
7. Fascist government used the migration to Nazi Germany as a tool to gain consent in the areas with higher unemployment. However, from those areas it dispatched people with low industrial skills, often farmers or handicraftsmen. Anyway, the majority of Italian factories had a technical backwardness against the German ones.
8. Germany also obtained from Italian government a better rate of change for migrants' remittances.

9. Germans were very sensitive about the break of contracts by Italian workers, and harshly repressed them, asking Italian authorities to assume a similar approach: control at the border to arrest the flying workers.
10. Also, Italian industrialists disliked this migration, because they had difficulties to find workers, and the labor cost was increasing.
11. The **Repubblica Sociale Italiana** (RSI) was established by Mussolini and other Fascist leaders on 23 of September 1943. It was totally submitted to the German wills both in the internal and economic policies, and in the foreign and military affairs. About German occupation, there are two essential books: [12], [13].
12. About remittances and clearing, see [14].
13. The subsidies were established with the Duce's Decree n. 800, on 13 of October 1943.
14. In the areas between Neaples and the new German line (the so-called "Gustav line") on the Garigliano river, Germans made some mass roundups. The most impressive was performed on 22-23 of September 1943. Immediately before German retreat, they rounded up around twenty thousand of men, and more than 1.000 were dispatched to the Reich. See [15].
15. About the enforced laborers in Savona and in Liguria region, see [17].
16. 1.007.000 Italian soldiers were captured by Germans immediately after 8 of September in Italy, France, Greece, Albania, and Balkans. 196.000 of them escaped or were released by the Germans, and 197.000 accepted to enlist in the RSI Army or in the German Wehrmacht, Flack and SS (partly immediately, and partly during the following months). More than 610.000 refused to continue to fight for Mussolini and Hitler, and at least 13.000 were killed during the capture or the transportation to Germany. They were arrested by Germans and became Internati Militari Italiani (Italian Military Internees - IMI). About them there is a very rich bibliography. The last book, with good bibliographic references, is [18]. See also [19], [20].
17. About German war crimes in Italy see: [24], [25].
18. **Ras** is the highest title of the local aristocracy, usually given to the rulers of the regions. Usually translated as prince or prince.

References

1. Brunello Mantelli (editor), 2019, *Tante braccia per il Reich. Il reclutamento di manodopera nell'Italia occupata 1943-1945 per l'economia di guerra della Germania nazionalsocialista* [Many arms for the Reich. The recruitment of labor in occupied Italy 1943-1945 for the war economy of National Socialist Germany], 2 volumes, Milano, Mursia, 2019. (In Italian).
2. Brunello Mantelli, 2003, Braccia italiane per l'economia di guerra del Terzo Reich: lavoratori civili, internati, deportati 1938-1945 [Italian arms for the war economy of the Third Reich: civil workers, internees, deported 1938-1945], in *"Geschichte und Region / Storia e Regione"*, n. 1, 2003, pp. 39-71. (In Italian).
3. Brunello Mantelli, 1992, L'arruolamento di civili italiani come manodopera per il Terzo Reich dopo l'8 settembre 1943 [The recruitment of Italian civilians as labor for the Third Reich after 8 September 1943], in Nicola Labanca (editor), *Fra sterminio e sfruttamento. Militari italiani e prigionieri di guerra nella Germania nazista (1939-1943)* [Between extermination and exploitation. Italian soldiers and prisoners of war in Nazi Germany (1939-1943)], Firenze, Le lettere, 1992, pp. 227-247. (In Italian).
4. Brunello Mantelli, 2004, Terzo Reich, industria di guerra e questione della manodopera 1933-1945 [Third Reich, war industry and the question of manpower 1933-1945], in *"Storia e memoria"*, n. 2, 2004, pp. 213-234. (In Italian).
5. Riciotti Lazzeri, 1996, *Gli schiavi di Hitler* [Hitler's slaves], Milano, Mondadori, 1996. (In Italian).
6. Lutz Klinkhammer, 2003, Il trasferimento coatto di civili al lavoro forzato in Germania: alcune considerazioni [The forced transfer of civilians to forced labor in Germany: some considerations], in *"Storia e problemi contemporanei"*, n. 32, 2003, pp. 13-24. (In Italian).
7. Roberto Mira, 2012, Razzie di uomini per il lavoro forzato nella Germania nazista. Una messa a punto sul caso italiano [Raiding of Men for Forced Labor in Nazi Germany. A review of the Italian case], in *"Storia contemporanea"*, n. 266, 2012, pp. 80-95. (In Italian).
8. Irene Guerrini, Marco Pluviano, 2015, La deportazione politica nei campi di concentramento e il lavoro coatto nel Reich [Political deportation to concentration camps and forced labor in the Reich], in Maria Elisabetta Tonizzi, Paolo Battifora (editors), *Genova 1943-1945. Occupazione tedesca, fascismo repubblicano e Resistenza* [Genoa 1943-1945. German occupation, republican fascism and resistance], Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino editore, 2015, pp. 235-264. (In Italian).
9. Giovanna D'Amico, Irene Guerrini, Brunello Mantelli, 2020, *Lavorare per il Reich. Fonti archivistiche per lo studio del prelievo di manodopera per la Germania durante la Repubblica Sociale Italiana* [Working for the Reich. Archival sources for the study of labor withdrawal for Germany during the Italian Social Republic], Aprilia, Novalogos, 2020. (In Italian).
10. Brunello Mantelli, 1992, *Camerati del lavoro. L'arruolamento di lavoratori italiani per il Terzo Reich nel periodo dell'Asse 1938-1943* [Work comrades. The recruitment of Italian workers for the Third Reich during the 1938-1943 Axis period], Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1992. (In Italian).
11. Cesare Bermiani, 1998, *Al lavoro nella Germania di Hitler. Racconti e memorie dell'emigrazione italiana 1937-1945* [At work in Hitler's Germany. Stories and memories of Italian emigration 1937-1945], Torino, Boringhieri, 1998. (In Italian).
12. Enzo Collotti, 1963, *L'amministrazione tedesca dell'Italia occupata 1943-1945. Studio e documenti* [The German administration of occupied Italy 1943-1945. Study and documents], Milano, Lerici, 1963. (In Italian).

13. Lutz Klinkhammer, 1993, *Zwischen Bündnis und Besatzung: das nationalsozialistische Deutschland und die Republik von Salò 1943-1945* [Between alliance and occupation: National Socialist Germany and the Republic of Salò 1943-1945], Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1993. (In German)
14. Irene Guerrini, Marco Pluviano, 2019, *Aspetti del reclutamento per il lavoro coatto nel Reich a Genova e nella sua provincia, 1943-1945* [Aspects of recruitment for forced labor in the Reich in Genoa and its province, 1943-1945], in Brunello Mantelli (editor), *Tante braccia per il Reich. Il reclutamento di manodopera nell'Italia occupata 1943-1945 per l'economia di guerra della Germania nazionalsocialista* [Many arms for the Reich. The recruitment of labor in occupied Italy 1943-1945 for the war economy of National Socialist Germany], 2 volumes, Milano, Mursia, 2019, pp. 467-776. (In Italian).
15. Maria Gabriella Gribaudo, 2005, *Guerra totale. Tra bombe alleate e violenze naziste. Napoli e il fronte meridionale 1940-1944* [Total war. Between allied bombs and Nazi violence. Naples and the southern front 1940-1944], Torino, Boringhieri, 2005. (In Italian).
16. Claudio Della Valle (editor), 2017, *Operai, fabbrica, Resistenza. Conflitto e potere nel triangolo industriale (1943-1945)* [Workers, factory, Resistance. Conflict and power in the industrial triangle (1943-1945)], "Annali della Fondazione Di Vittorio 2015", Roma, Ediesse, 2017. (In Italian).
17. Irene Guerrini, Marco Pluviano, 2020, *Occupazione tedesca e prelievo di manodopera per il Reich dalla Liguria* [German occupation and removal of labor for the Reich from Liguria], in "Storia e memoria", n. 2, 2020, pp. 119-190. (In Italian).
18. Mario Avagliano, Marco Palmieri, 2020, *I militari italiani nei lager nazisti. Una resistenza senz'armi (1943-1945)* [The Italian soldiers in the Nazi concentration camps. A resistance without arms (1943-1945)], Bologna, Il Mulino, 2020. (In Italian).
19. Gerhard Schreiber, 1990, *Die italienischen Militärinternierten im Deutschland Machtbereich 1943-1945* [The Italian military internees in Germany 1943-1945], München, De Gruyter, 1990. (In German)
20. Gabriele Hammermann, 2004, *Gli internati militari italiani in Germania 1943-1945* [The Italian military internees in Germany 1943-1945], Bologna, Il Mulino, 2004. (In Italian).
21. Ulrich Herbert, *Fremdarbeiter. Politik und Praxis des Ausländer-Einsatzes in der Kriegswirtschaft des dritten Reiches* [Ulrich Herbert, foreign worker. Politics and practice of the deployment of foreigners in the war economy of the Third Reich], H. W. Dietz Nachf., Berlin-Bonn 1985. (In German)
22. W. Naasner, 1994, *Neue Machtzentren in der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft 1942-1945* [New Centers of Power in the German War Economy 1942-1945], Boldt, Boppard am Reihn 1994. (In German)
23. Brunello Mantelli, 2019, *Tra Marte e Vulcano. Manodopera italiana nell'economia di guerra del Terzo Reich: una circolarità* [Between Mars and Vulcano. Italian labor in the war economy of the Third Reich: a circularity], in Brunello Mantelli (editor), *Tante braccia per il Reich. Il reclutamento di manodopera nell'Italia occupata 1943-1945 per l'economia di guerra della Germania nazionalsocialista* [Many arms for the Reich. The recruitment of labor in occupied Italy 1943-1945 for the war economy of National Socialist Germany], 2 volumes, Milano, Mursia, 2019, pp. 23-78. (In Italian).
24. Carlo Gentile, 2012, *Wehrmacht und Waffen SS im Partisanrieg: Italien 1943-1945* [Wehrmacht and Waffen SS in Partisan War: Italy 1943-1945], Paderborn, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2012. (In German)
25. Gianluca Fulvetto, Paolo Pezzino, 2017, *Zone di guerra, geografie di sangue. L'atlante delle stragi naziste e fasciste in Italia (1943-1945)* [War zones, geographies of blood. The Atlas of the Nazi and Fascist massacres in Italy (1943-1945)], Bologna, Il Mulino, 2017. (In Italian).

Information about the authors

Irene Guerrini, Dr. Sci. (History), vice director of the Social sciences library at the University of Genoa, member of the Scientific committee of ILSREC, Regional Institute for the history of the Resistance movement and the Contemporary age, Genoa, Liguria, Italy.

Marco Pluviano, Dr. Sci. (History), member of the Scientific committee of ILSREC, Regional Institute for the history of the Resistance movement and the Contemporary age, member of the Scientific committee of the French Collectif de recherche international et de debat sur la guerre 1914-1918, Genoa, Liguria, Italy.

Corresponding author

Marco Pluviano, e-mail: m.pluviano@alice.it