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THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT AND POLAND FROM THE 1840s TO THE 1870s¹

IN THE SECOND HALF of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire assumed a political character and gained ground among the intelligentsia. After some hesitation, the imperial government took a hostile position regarding this movement. Beginning from the Valuev Circular of July 1863, which banned all literature in Ukrainian except fiction, the government often claimed that the Ukrainian movement acted in unison with the Polish movement for independence. In this article, I examine perceptions of Poles and Poland among Ukrainian national activists, the political contacts between the Ukrainian and Polish movements, and the perception of Ukrainian-Polish relations in government circles. I find that the authorities understood rather well the substantial differences between the two national movements and occasionally mobilized Ukrainians against Poles. They did not consider the Ukrainian movement a Polish creation.

The Slavic Society of St Cyril and St Methodius was the first Ukrainian nationalist secret political society in the Russian Empire. The society,

¹ The following article derives from the book *Brothers or Enemies: the Ukrainian National Movement and Russia from the 1840s to the 1870s* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

Johannes REMY, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w imperium rosyjskim a Polska w latach 1840–1870*
Poparcie dla ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego zwiększyło się i uzyskało charakter jednoznacznie polityczny w kręgach inteligenckich imperium rosyjskiego w drugim trzydziestolecu XIX w. Ruch ten wynikał z opozycji wobec Rosjan i Polaków, dwóch narodowości tradycyjnie dominujących na Ukrainie, które miały rozwiniętą własną kulturę wysoką. Władze rosyjskie najpierw wahały się w stosunku do ruchu ukraińskiego: jedni politycy chcieli użyć Ukraińców przeciw Polakom, inni popierali represje wobec Ukraińców. [...] (cd. na str. 561).

which was denounced the authorities in March 1847, has been studied extensively². The goal of the society was to establish a pan-Slavic republican federation, with Ukraine as one of its constituent states. Ukrainian conspirators viewed political questions in religious terms and identified Christianity with political liberty and social equality, at least in the sense of the abolition of estate privileges. The society's programmatic text *Zakon Bozhyi* (*God's Law*) was a creative reinterpretation of the ideas contained in Mickiewicz's *Books of the Polish Nation*, with Ukraine (instead of Poland) assigned a crucial role in the regeneration of humankind³.

Although the Society aimed for the federation of all Slavs, Yurii Andruzky, a rank-and-file member, deemed an alliance with Poland against Russia possible. He wrote a poem entitled "Dear Pole", describing Polish and Muscovite atrocities in Ukraine, but nevertheless rated contemporary Poland's struggle for liberty as a positive phenomenon. He called on Ukrainians and Poles to embrace each other and begin armed struggle⁴. Naturally, in his poetry, Andruzky could express radical ideas that he did not necessarily intend to put into practice. However, a plan for a federation uniting Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, Moldova, the Baltic region (i.e., today's Estonia and Latvia), as well as the Don River region, Bulgaria, and Serbia, but excluding Russia, was found among Andruzky's papers in Petrozavodsk, his place of deportation in March 1850⁵.

After Alexander II succeeded Nicholas I, the members of the Cyrillo-Methodian society were all fully pardoned, and Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish and Vasyl Bilozersky resumed their Ukrainian national work. In 1857, Kulish had an incident with censorship, indicating that the authorities were more concerned with maintaining stability than turning the population against Poles at the time. His *Hramatka* (1857) was the first primer in modern Ukrainian, and it contained an unequivocally nationalistic message. The book was authorized for publication

² S. B i l e n k y, *Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe: Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian Political Imaginations* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012) 286-300; G.S.N. L u c k y j, *Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Kiev, 1845-1847* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1991), 29-56, 85-110; P.A. Z a i o n c h k o v s k i i, *Kirillo-Mefodievskoe obshchestvo (1846-1847)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1959), 79-110; *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo: U tr'okh tomakh*, ed. P. Sokhan' et al. (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 1990).

³ The full text of the two versions of *God's Law* is in *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, 1: 152-69, 250-8; for a discussion of this document, see L u c k y j, *Young Ukraine*, 47-51; Z a i o n c h k o v s k i i, *Kirillo-Mefodievskoe* 7-12, 79-82, 90-2.

⁴ *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo* 2: 455-6; the poem beginning with the words *Liashchenku, liashche*. The proposed armed struggle is described in old Cossack terms as one fought with swords on horseback, which points to the fact that it is not necessarily a contemporary call to arms.

⁵ *Ibidem*, 2: 570; Andruzky's plan for a constitution. Interestingly enough, his prospective Ukraine included Galicia as well as Krakow, the Black Sea coastal region, and Crimea. B i l e n k y, *Romantic Nationalism*, 69-70.

by both censors, secular and synodal. It began with biblical citations and their explanations. However, beginning with Lesson 7, the texts and their explanations were no longer from the Bible, but from purported Ukrainian folk songs that described the Cossack wars against the Poles. Many of these folk songs were actually forgeries that were first published in Izmail Sreznevsky's *Zaporozhian Antiquities* in 1833-1838⁶. Writing about the Cossack wars, Kulish hinted at their relevance to his own times:

The hearts of Ukrainians strengthened under misfortune, and they rose above all turmoil, the whole country arose like one soul against the unrighteous Polish force – and soon not a single traitor or foreigner remained in Ukraine. From that emerged the idea: there is no one who can beat us, for a nation that rises up for its faith and rights is invincible in its strength. Poland was a great realm; it stretched from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea. Now look what is left of her! [...] Today, Poland is a great cemetery of ancient glory, and in that cemetery the living weep for the dead. It is no one else, but we who have done this. The Poles exhausted our patience with their insults: we shook and Poland quaked. It quaked until its neighbours caused it collapse, altogether. Thus, God punishes earthly kingdoms by the same hand that once defended them!⁷

Kulish's primer reached a considerable number of peasants. In late 1860, Kulish mentioned in a letter that he had sold out the entire first edition of 5000 copies. The fact that a second edition of 8000 copies was printed in 1861, supports the veracity of his claim⁸. *Hramatka* did not pass unnoticed. The governor-general of Kyiv, Ilarion Ilarionovich Vasilchikov, banned the book in the area under his administration, which included all of Right-bank Ukraine. Vasilchikov reported to the Imperial Chancellery's Third Section, the political police, that the Polish nobles who had informed him about the primer feared that its dissemination among the common people might strengthen the peasants' national hatred of their Polish overlords. The governor-general accepted this view, adding that most of his region consisted of "the previous Ukraine, the indigenous population of which (peasants and the common people in general) always felt hatred for the Poles, who form the majority of noble landowners"⁹. However, Vasilchikov did not want to ban

⁶ [Panteleimon Kulish], *Hramatka* (St Petersburg: V tipografii P.A. Kulisha, 1857), 10-14, 27, 30, 33, 35, 37-9; on the forged songs, see Vladimir Antonovich and Mykhailo Drahomanov (eds.), *Istoricheskie pesni maloruskago naroda s ob"iasneniami Vl. Antonovicha i M. Dragomanova*. 2 Vols. (Kyiv: Tipografiia M.P. Fritsa, 1874-5) 2: ii-iii.

⁷ [Kulish], *Hramatka*, 28-9.

⁸ I. Nakhlik, *Panteleimon Kulish: Osobystist', pys'mennyk, myslytel': Naukova monohrafiia*. 2 vols. (Kyiv: Ukrains'kyi pys'mennyk, 2007) 1: 134-5.

⁹ TsDIA Uk., f. 442, Op. 808, delo 99, ark. 2 (Vasilchikov to Dolgorukov, 24 May 1858).

the book altogether. He was only concerned about his own district and its Polish nobility, but was not against the book being circulated elsewhere.

The triangle of Ukrainian-Russian-Polish relations was often discussed in the journal *Osnova*, which Ukrainian activists launched in January 1861. Politically, it followed the Cyrillo-Methodian line, supporting a federal solution to the Ukrainian question. Owing to official censorship and prudent self-censorship, the editors did not state this program explicitly, but it was not difficult to read between the lines. The prospective federation included – at minimum – Russia, Ukraine and Poland, and was based on popular representation. The programme was broached in a number of articles and works of fiction.

Kostomarov's article "Vyhovsky's Hetmanate" is an example of political agitation through historiography¹⁰. The article dealt with Bohdan Khmelnytsky's successor, who sided with Poland against Muscovy. In 1658, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky concluded the Treaty of Hadiach with Poland-Lithuania. Kostomarov perceived a Great Russian lack of respect for local customs, pressure on the local Orthodox Church to submit to Moscow, and the curtailment of Ukrainian autonomy, as the causes leading to the Union of Hadiach. Although he criticized Vyhovsky, Kostomarov let "his" Vyhovsky deliver a number of speeches heavily critical of Muscovite policies. The article also included a speech by King Jan Kazimierz, in which he emphasized the attempted union as a merger between two Slavic nations. Kostomarov had a habit of inserting fictitious speeches into his works.

The editors of *Osnova* explicitly backed Kostomarov's pan-Slavic orientation:

The best statesmen (*deiateli*) of their time wanted to establish, maintain, and expand the [new] political order. Their goal was not submission of one nation to another, not even submission of a part to the whole, but a federal, equal relationship among its parts. This order was based on a perpetual peace and strong alliance, which [...] the Muscovite monarch and people would also join. The Polish nobility either was not able or did not want to understand this noble task, although [...] that solution followed from the nature of things, from the relatedness and geographic unity of the Slavic world. Egoism of social rank prevented the natural course of Polish and Russian, consequently, also of all Slavic history [...]. Submitting themselves to cold and unfeeling Jesuit ideas, the Polish nobility was the first to sever the ties that united the neighbouring Slavic nations with each other. Only in the future [...] perhaps, will it be possible to renew the natural principles that elevated them¹¹.

Promoting a federation between Russia, Poland and Ukraine was a bold act, and incompatible with autocratic policies. The above-cited text was published in

¹⁰ N. Kostomarov, "Getmanstvo Vygovskogo", *Osnova*, No. 4 (1861): 1-66; *Osnova*, No. 7 (1861): 67-114.

¹¹ "Po povodu aktov, otnosiashchykhsia do iugo-zapadnoi Rusi", *Osnova*, No. 3 (1861): 1-2.

April 1861, at a time of serious unrest in the Kingdom of Poland. However, the editors' message was softened by criticism of the Poles.

Osnova wrote frequently about past Ukrainian-Polish conflicts. Whether fiction or non-fiction, these texts consistently followed the established national mythology; Polish oppression had caused the Ukrainian uprising and liberation struggle. There was a greater variety of opinions on the contemporary Polish question. It was discussed in Kostomarov's articles: "An Answer to the Claims of the Newspaper *Czas* and the Journal *Revue Contemporaine*"¹² and "The Truth to the Poles about Rus'"¹³. Kostomarov emphasized how the majority of the population in the contested Right-bank Ukraine were South Russians, not Poles. He found that historical arguments no longer had relevance to the contemporary political situation. Calls for separation from Russia and union with Poland would only feed into the traditional enmity of South Russians towards Poles. He felt that the Poles should begin to treat the South Russians "as a nation equal to you, respect our striving for the independent development of our national forces (*narodnykh sil*)"¹⁴. History was moving in the direction of a union of Slavic nations, not their separation. Kostomarov thus renounced an alliance with the Poles against the Russian Empire, at the same time upholding the Cyrillo-Methodian idea of pan-Slavic unity. Kostomarov's rejection of Polish strivings for independence did not mean support for Russian imperial policies. Indeed, in March 1861, he attended a memorial mass in St Petersburg for demonstrators killed by Russian troops in Warsaw. Kostomarov attended in full knowledge of the fact that the event was a political demonstration. His presence was noted in the journal *Kolokol* (*The Bell*), published in London by the socialist Alexander Herzen¹⁵.

Kostomarov's "Answer to the Claims of the Newspaper *Czas* and the Journal *Revue Contemporaine*" was one of the few articles to appear in *Osnova* that faced obstruction from censors. During discussions of the article in February 1861, the St Petersburg Censorship Committee decided to suppress the article on the grounds that it might spark dissatisfaction among the Poles at a time when Poland was already in turmoil¹⁶. Furthermore, the committee noted that although Kostomarov was describing history, he was in fact writing about the contemporary situation in Poland. This was evident in a passage which he had first written in the present tense, then later corrected, changing it to the past tense. It was also

¹² *Osnova*, No. 2 (1861): 121-35.

¹³ *Osnova*, No. 10 (1861): 100-12.

¹⁴ N. K o s t o m a r o v, "Pravda poliakam o Rusi", *Osnova*, No. 10 (1861): 112.

¹⁵ "Peterburgskii universitet", *Kolokol*, 1 July 1861, 856-7. The invitations to the event were distributed at Shevchenko's (first) funeral in St Petersburg.

¹⁶ RGIA, f. 772, Op. 1, delo 5603, l. 1 (unsigned and undated document written as background material for the session of the Main Administration of Censorship).

not the government's practice to respond to any foreign periodicals. Kostomarov appealed the decision to the Main Administration of Censorship. Among other arguments, he pointed to the fact that in the article he emphasized his patriotic Russian stance. He wrote: "There are no ethnographic or historical grounds for establishing a separate state on the territory between the Oder, Dvina, and Dni-pro"¹⁷. In his turn, the editor, Bilozersky, emphasized the Polish impact on public opinion, especially in Austria and France. For this reason, he found it necessary to refute their claims that the population of Right-bank Ukraine was Polish¹⁸. The Main Administration of Censorship decided to allow the article, provided some minor changes were made.

Kostomarov's disapproval of Polish strivings for independence did not mean that he was hostile to Poles. As late as November 1861, Kostomarov criticized the Moscow Slavophiles for their antipathy towards Poles¹⁹. In February 1861, *Osnova* published a text that criticized imperial policies regarding Poles. This was a traveller's tale from Right-bank Ukraine, written under the pseudonym "P. Neobachny" (The Incautious) and dated 28 February 1847, at the very time repressions against the Cyrillo-Methodians were taking place. The author describes the ruins of a Jesuit monastery, which were now being used as billets for Russian troops. The unpleasant impression the scene left on the author was manifest²⁰. To be sure, in the second half of 1861, *Osnova* began to publish articles evaluating the negative role of contemporary Poles in Ukraine. The young Kyiv-based Ukrainophiles, Volodymyr Antonovych and Tadei Rylsky, wrote on contemporary Ukrainian-Polish relations in an anti-Polish tone. These two authors were recent defectors from the Polish movement to the Ukrainian movement²¹. Antonovych could find no place for a Polish minority in Ukraine: "Polish nobles who live in the South Russian region have only two choices before their conscience: either [...] return to the nationality once deserted by their ancestors, to compensate by constant work and charity [...] for all the evil that they have caused the people; who fed many generations of colonists and were paid for their sweat and blood with contempt, curses, insults against their religion, habits, morals and character.

¹⁷ RGIA, f. 772, Op. 1, delo 5607, l. 2 (unsigned and undated document written as background material to enable the Main Administration of Censorship to reach a decision; it includes the contents of Kostomarov's appeal; the quotation is from this detailed recapitulation of his appeal).

¹⁸ RGIA, f. 772, Op. 1, delo 5607, l. 2-4 (Bilozersky's arguments for the article to be permitted).

¹⁹ N. Kostomarov, "Pravda moskvicham o Rusi", *Osnova*, No. 10 (1861): 11-12 (dated 29 November 1861).

²⁰ P. Neobachnyi, "Znaidenyi na dorozhi lyst", *Osnova*, No. 2 (1861): 233-8.

²¹ F. Rylskii [Tadei Ryl's'kyi], "Neskol'ko slov o dvorianakh pravogo berega Dnepra", *Osnova*, Nos. 11-12 (1861): 90-9.

Or [...] they can resettle in Poland”²². Thus, for Antonovych, national and social liberation was tantamount to creating ethnic and cultural unity. His stance was tougher against local Poles than even the Russian government’s policies. Antonovych’s article was inspired by an unwritten agreement concluded between the Kyiv Hromada and Governor-General Vasilchikov, which I will return to later.

An additional censorship case involving a Ukrainian book with a Polish aspect was that of Kulish’s *Khmelnyshchyna* (*The Khmelnytsky Era*), a popular history of the Khmelnytsky Uprising which he submitted to the censors in 1860. The censor, V. Beketov, found a few passages inappropriate: “that hint that Little Russia was oppressed when the Russians occupied it.” Furthermore, he doubted whether a history of Little Russia could be permitted at all, for such a book “seems to express [the idea of] the independence of that region”²³. The Main Administration of Censorship referred the manuscript for evaluation to the censor Aleksandr Vasilevich Nikitenko, professor of Russian Literature in St Petersburg, also of Ukrainian peasant background. Nikitenko disagreed with Beketov, declaring that censorship could not prevent the publication of separate histories of those parts of the empire that had previously been independent. However, he stipulated that the authors of such histories must write them only with scholarly and literary aims, “without any conception of the possibility of separate existence, without any separatist doctrines and intentions”²⁴. Nikitenko doubted whether *The Khmelnytsky Era* was just such a book. Since he had only a sample of the text at his disposal, Nikitenko did not give his final verdict concerning the entire book. However, he agreed that the passages marked by Beketov must not be permitted.

Nikitenko’s evaluation of *The Khmelnytsky Era* almost triggered a circular against Ukrainian “separatist” historiography. Remarks made on its margins indicate that, to begin with, a decision was made to distribute a circular to all the censorship committees to serve as a guideline. However, once the circular was prepared, the director of the Main Administration of Censorship, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mukhanov, had it recalled and destroyed. Nevertheless, he included Nikitenko’s main findings in his response to the St Petersburg Censorship Committee, adding that the case of Kulish’s work had to be decided according to

²² V. Antonovich [Volodymyr Antonovych], “Moia ispoved’: Otvēt g. Padalitse”, *Osnova*, No. 1 (1861): 94.

²³ RGIA, f. 772, Op. 1, delo 5536, l. 1 (Nikolai Vasilevich Medem, chairman of the St Petersburg Censorship Committee, to Main Administration of Censorship, 17 December 1860. Both quotations are from his rendering of Beketov’s report).

²⁴ *Ibidem*, l. 2 (Nikitenko’s evaluation of *Khmelnyshchyna*, undated; received on 21 January 1861).

those considerations. The book was permitted after the excision of passages about Russian oppression of Little Russia, which Beketov had marked²⁵.

Why did Mukhanov go back on his own decision? He had decided to send the circular on 21 January 1861, and cancelled it a month later on 22 February, Old Style. The abolition of serfdom was enacted between those two dates, on 19 February. It is possible that Mukhanov was loath to cause unnecessary unrest at that time. However, it is even more likely that he reacted to events in Warsaw, which brought home the threat of another Polish uprising against the empire to imperial bureaucrats. In this situation, Mukhanov found it expedient to permit Kulish's book *The Khmelnytsky Era* and other, similar Ukrainian publications, as a counterweight to Polish agitation. Thus, the Warsaw demonstrators and the negative image of Poles and Polish rule in Kulish's work helped make it more accessible to the Ukrainian public²⁶.

The Kyiv Hromada and its Alliance with the Governor-General

The Kyiv Hromada was the most important of the Ukrainian groups that existed in Ukraine in the early 1860s. A substantial portion of its members had Polish roots. In its early period, the Kyiv Hromada was essentially a student organization, formed through the amalgamation of a group of Polish Ukrainophile students from the right bank with another student group, which included students from the left bank. The combination of Ukrainian and Polish national identity runs counter to the tenets of present-day Ukrainian nationalism. In the 1850s, however, it was not a surprising choice for young, educated Right-bank nobles with democratic and populist leanings. Within the Polish national movement, two different concepts of Polish nationality coexisted²⁷. One of them was based on ethnicity, and included the idea of either Roman Catholicism or the use of the Polish language, as a necessary condition of Polish national identity. However, there also existed a Polish nationality concept based on the pre-partition, Pol-

²⁵ *Ibidem*, I, 3-4 (decision about the circular, 21 January 1861; information about its rescindment, 22 February 1861; Nikolai Mukhanov to St Petersburg Censorship Committee, 22 February 1861); cf. A. Miller, *The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century* (Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2003) 61-2, who finds that the Main Administration of Censorship naively failed to discover Ukrainian separatism in *Khmelnyshchyna*. Miller does not mention either the intended circular or that anything was removed from the text.

²⁶ For the negative image of Poles, see P. Kulish, *Khmel'nyshchyna* (St Petersburg: P.A. Kulish, 1861), 105-8, 110-12.

²⁷ J. Remy, "The Past of Poland-Lithuania in the Polish National Movement, 1830-1864", in L. Erikson and L. Müller (eds.) *Statehood Beyond and Before Ethnicity: Transnational Perspectives onto Smaller States of Europe, 1600-2000* (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2005) 219-42.

ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. According to this perception, all the inhabitants of Poland-Lithuania – within its pre-partition borders – were Poles.

Polish Ukrainophiles sought to elevate the status of the Ukrainian language, gain federal status for Ukraine, abolish all estate privileges and enact a land reform. The group included both followers of Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy²⁸. The uncontested leader of this group, and of the Kyiv regional organization of the Polish student union, was Volodymyr Antonovych (Włodzimierz Antonowicz). His ideological outlook was shaped mainly by French enlightenment literature, such as that of Montesquieu, Rousseau and Voltaire²⁹. However, Antonovych's Polish influences included Michał Czajkowski's romantic works. Volodymyr Miiakovsky disputed Antonovych's involvement in Polish insurgent organizations before his full conversion to an exclusively Ukrainian identity, pointing to the unreliable character of testimonies of Polish insurgents, pressured by the Russian authorities while under interrogation³⁰. However, several Polish memoir writers confirm the fact that Antonovych did indeed belong to the leading triad of the Triple Union (*Związek Trójnicki*), the Polish political conspiracy in Kyiv. There are two memoirs that confirm how Antonovych fulfilled his obligations as a Polish conspirator as late as 1860. Through Antonovych, students in Moscow and St Petersburg established contacts with Polish émigrés, who were organizing military training in Italy at the time³¹.

In the first months of 1861, Antonovych faced a situation which forced him to make a definite choice between the Polish and Ukrainian nationalities. In January, continuous denunciations by the Polish nobility led to an investigation of Antonovych and Rylsky. Rylsky was reported to have mixed with peasants socially with the aim of inciting them against the nobility, as well as recounting stories about Cossack times and Taras Shevchenko³². Although the denunciations against Antonovych were much less detailed, they indicated his leading role in

²⁸ [E. U.], "Paryż w m. czerwcu 1866", *Siolo*, No. 1 (1866): 14-9.

²⁹ V. A n t o n o v y c h, *Tvory*, Vol. 1 (Kyiv: Vseukraïns'ka Akademiia Nauk, 1932), 40; for general discussion of Antonovych, see Bohdan Klid, "Volodymyr Antonovych: The Making of a Ukrainian Populist Activist and Historian", PhD. diss. (University of Alberta, 1992); V. Ul'ianovs'kyi and V. Korotkyi, *Volodymyr Antonovych: Obraz na tli epokhy* (Kyiv: Tov. "Mizhnarodna finansova ahentsiia", 1997).

³⁰ V. M i j a k o v s ' k y, *Nedrukovane i zabute: Hromads'ki rukhy dev'iatnadtsiatioho storichchia* (New York: Ukraïns'ka vil'na Akademiia Nauk, 1984), 323-34.

³¹ L. S y r o c z y Ń s k i, *Z przed 50 lat: Wspomnienie bylego studenta Kijowskiego uniwersytetu Leona Syroczyńskiego* (Lviv: Nakładem autora, 1914), 21; G. R e u t, "Do legionów (Z notatek rodzinnych)", in B. Szwarce et al. (eds.), *W czterdziestą rocznicę powstania styczniowego 1863-1903* (Lviv: Nakładem Komitetu Wydawniczego, 1903), 357.

³² TsDIA Uk., f. 442, Op. 810, ark. 30-7, 91-2 (reports of the acting chief of the Kyiv police to Vasilchikov, 13 December 1860 and 9 January 1861).

the group. Antonovych and Rylsky were not arrested, but their lodgings were searched. Some illegal literature was found, most notably excerpts from *Kolokol* and General Ludwik Mierosławski's military manual for Polish insurgents³³.

Under interrogation, Antonovych laid out his principles in a frank manner. In order to prove his loyalty to the empire, he referred to widespread antipathy among the Polish nobility. He explained that the slanderous denunciations stemmed from their resentment of his position that the right bank of the Dnipro was not Polish, but South Russian territory³⁴. The final outcome of the investigation may be defined as a truce between the authorities and the Hromada³⁵. Although the investigating commission did not fully trust Antonovych, it viewed his and his adherents' activities in a positive light, making practical proposals for cooperation between the government and Ukrainian activists:

In Antonovych's answers, the disagreement that has emerged between some Polish students and local Polish nobles concerning the South Russian character of this region deserves special attention and the necessity to recognize that fact without unnecessary resistance against it [...] According to Antonovych, the students expected a press discussion as a result of the controversy. It is evident from his answers that he, together with Rylsky, is going to work on the [historical] materials that they have collected, and publish them [...] If the young scholars have honestly taken up objective research on the history of the South Russian region and [...] need documentary materials, then it would be useful for them to join their work with that of the Archeographic Commission, since the commission has a great deal of documents [...] Their literary undertakings would be part of the commission's work. However, this would not in the least violate their right to send their articles to be printed in any publication of their choosing³⁶.

It is likely that in return for this favourable treatment, Antonovych had to promise to abstain from subversive action and to follow an anti-Polish orientation. If Antonovych gave the investigators any information about the Polish student union and the Triple Union, it was not recorded in the official documents, and no action against their leading activists was taken. It is possible that the authorities did not demand such information from him, since it would have jeopardized the

³³ TsDIA Uk., f. 442, Op. 810, ark. 201-4 (description of Rylski's papers and books in the final report of the investigating commission, 18 January 1861); f. 442, Op. 810, ark. 235 (description of Antonovych's papers and books in the undated final report on him, received by Vasilchikov on 3 March).

³⁴ *Ibidem*, ark. 259-63 (Antonovych's answers to the investigating commission, 11 February 1861).

³⁵ I have presented this hypothesis briefly in an earlier publication: J. Remy, "National Aspect of Student Movements in St. Vladimir's University of Kiev 1855-1863," *Skhid/Zakhid, Istoryko-kul'turolohichnyi zbirnyk*, No. 7 (2005): 261-2; see also F. Hillis, *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of the Russian Nation* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2013) 63-4.

³⁶ TsDIA Uk., f. 442, Op. 810, sprava 132, ark. 242 (final report of the investigating commission).

whole arrangement. For the same reason, no proper investigation of Antonovych's previous role in Polish organizations was undertaken.

In the investigation documents, there is no mention of the Hromada as an organization, or any agreement with it, for such formal recognition would have run counter to the imperial administration's principles. However, Antonovych soon wrote and published several anti-Polish texts, the most remarkable of which was *My Confession*, cited above. In 1863, he entered the service of the Kyiv Archeographic Commission, as the investigators had previously proposed. Furthermore, the hypothesis of the existence of a truce between Ukrainian activists and the imperial authorities is corroborated by Governor-General Vasilchikov's actions. Immediately after receiving the final report of the investigating commission on Rylsky and Antonovych, Vasilchikov repealed the order to exile Rylsky to Kazan, even though it had already been confirmed by Alexander II³⁷. Alexander II accepted Vasilchikov's handling of the matter. In the following months, Vasilchikov continued to demonstrate his benevolent attitude to the Ukrainians. Vasilchikov's actions reveal that he had changed his earlier attitude and now considered the Ukrainian movement as a useful tactical ally in the struggle against the Polish independence movement.

By February and March 1861, the Hromada had begun to act as an independent group, siding with the Russians against the Poles. The most noteworthy activities of the early Hromada were in the spheres of student politics and popular enlightenment. Its members were active in the Sunday school movement and published elementary school textbooks in Ukrainian³⁸. The final break between the Hromada and the Poles took place in the fall of 1861, when the Ukrainian organization demanded that its members refrain from membership in any other national student union. Quite a few Polish Ukrainophiles showed their loyalty to the Polish movement and left the Hromada. The Polish Ukrainophile orientation

³⁷ GARF, f. 109, 1 eksp., 1861g., ed. hr. 29, l. 1-3, 11-13, 18-19 (Gendarme Officer Gribovskii to Dolgorukov, 21 January 1861; Dolgorukov to Alexander II, 16 February 1861; V. Koroliuk, ed. *Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie na Ukraine 1856-1862* (Kyiv: Vydavnytstvo Akademii Nauk Ukraïns'koï RSR, 1963) 86-7. Henceforward, this publication will be referred to as OPDU.

³⁸ Antonovych, *Tvory*, I: 54-5, 59; K. P. Mikhalchuk, "Iz ukrainskogo bylogo", *Ukrainskaia zhizn'*, Nos. 8-10 (1914): 70-1; P. Oznan'skii, "Vospominaniia", *Ukrainskaia zhizn'*, No. 5 (1913): 41-2; [Paulin Świącicki,] "Na gruzach: Powieść w dwóch tomach przez Teofila Szumskiego". *Siolo*, Vol. 2 (1867): 160, 162; Syroczyn'skii, *Z pred*, 21-2; V. M. Iuzefovich, "Tritsat' let tomu nazad". *Russkaia starina*, Vol. 84 (1895): No. 10, 171, 177-80, 186-90; P. Zhytets'kyi, "Z istorii Kyïvs'koï ukraïns'koï hromady: Promova na Shevchenkovyh rokovynakh", *Zapysky naukovoho tovarystva imeni Shevchenka* 116, No. 5 (1913): 178-9.

remained fairly strong within the Triple Union, even after its complete break with the Hromada³⁹.

In the fall of 1861, massive student demonstrations took place at most of the universities in Russia. In Kyiv, they had a national Polish character. The Kyiv Hromada disapproved of the demonstrations and was active in arranging a protest meeting against them⁴⁰. Despite the anti-Polish action of the Kyiv Hromada, its political orientation also contained aspects that were undesirable from the government's viewpoint. The case of the lieutenant-colonel and landowning nobleman, Andrii Krasovsky, indicates that some Hromada members sympathized with the Polish national movement. In September 1861, Krasovsky attended a memorial mass for Joachim Lelewel, which was arranged by the Polish student union⁴¹. In April 1862, the authorities issued a warning to Krasovsky. He was then placed under secret police surveillance after he was seen wearing "Little Russian garb" and holding discussions with peasants in the small town of Korsun, near Kyiv⁴². On 17 June 1862, Krasovsky was caught distributing copies of a handwritten proclamation to soldiers in Kyiv, urging them to refuse to suppress peasant disturbances in nearby locales. According to the proclamation, the soldiers were being sent against "their own people, Russians"⁴³, to shoot and beat peasants for the benefit of thieving bureaucrats and landowners.

After being severely wounded in the Crimean War, Krasovsky only nominally served in the army, without any real obligations, and the soldiers he tried to incite to mutiny were not under his command⁴⁴. Krasovsky's agitation does not seem to have been carefully thought out. When a sergeant-major questioned him on the spot, Krasovsky identified himself⁴⁵. After his arrest, he said he would only explain his motives to Alexander II in person⁴⁶. He later expressed his satisfaction at the death sentence he was handed. Krasovsky's eccentric behaviour may perhaps be

³⁹ Antonovych, *Tvory*, 1: 53-4; Syroczynski, *Z przed 50*, 29-30; Świecicki, "Na gruzach", 161-2; OPDU, 132-3; J. Tabiś, *Polacy na uniwersytecie Kijowskim 1834-1863* (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1974) 132.

⁴⁰ Iuzefovich, "Tridtsat' let", No. 11, 98-104; OPDU, 199; K.N. Rennenkampff, "Kievskaiia universitetskaia starina (Sobytiia v universitete Sv. Vladimira v 1860-1862 gg.)", *Russkaia starina* 99, No. 7 (1899) 42-5.

⁴¹ OPDU, 279.

⁴² *Ibidem*, 270 (Krasovsky's interrogation, 20 June 1862).

⁴³ *Ibidem*, 265-7 (complete text of Krasovsky's proclamation).

⁴⁴ OPDU, 290 (verdict of the court martial, 11 August 1862).

⁴⁵ RGVIA, f. 801, Op. 80/21, 3-e otd., 2-oi stol, 1862, delo 48, sv. 667, l. 200-1 (Sergeant-Major Evstigneev's testimony, 22 June 1862). At first Krasovsky gave his real name, but later produced a false one.

⁴⁶ OPDU, 270.

explained by the fact that of the severe wounds he suffered in Crimea, the most serious were head injuries⁴⁷.

The authorities found many handwritten, illegal texts in Krasovsky's possession – his own, Alexander Herzen's, Polish patriotic hymns and leaflets⁴⁸, Shevchenko poems, and other materials. The authorities also found issues of *Samostaine slovo* (*Independent Word*) and *Hromadnytsia* – handwritten journals that were circulated among the members of the Kyiv Hromada. The *Samostaine slovo* issues handed the authorities the opportunity to place Krasovsky's ideas within the wider context of the Kyiv Hromada. A writer, using the pseudonym "Volodar" (most likely Antonovych⁴⁹), authored an article entitled, "The Relationship between Rusyns and Muscovites." Volodar negatively evaluated the role of the Russian government in Ukraine as both nationally and socially oppressive, but praised the Russian radicals, identifying them as potential allies; they recognized the social and national rights of Ukrainians and understood that "our nation (*narod*) is not swept under their government by right; that it has the right to flourish in freedom now, and that in the future it has the right to independence."⁵⁰ Volodar's statement was one of the first instances that Ukrainian independence was mentioned as a goal.

Samostaine slovo contained much criticism of the Polish national movement and its plans for insurrection. However, the editors of both *Samostaine slovo* and *Hromadnytsia* specified that their anti-Polish position did not extend to Poles in the Kingdom of Poland, but only concerned attempts to establish Polish domination in Ukraine⁵¹. *Hromadnytsia* blamed the Great Russians (*moskali*), as well as Poles, for their sense of superiority in relation to Ukrainians, and predicted that "our people" would in time renounce both and keep far away from them⁵². However, the journal's main thrust was against the demonstrations and disturbances that were organized by Polish students at St Vladimir's University⁵³.

⁴⁷ RGVIA, f. 801, Op. 80/21, 3-e otd., 2-oi stol, 1862, delo 48, sv. 667, l. 529-30 (medical statement by Dr Meissner, Kyiv, 13 December 1857; French translation from the Russian original).

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, l. 275–7, 371-5. Apart from hymns, which were used by all orientations of the Polish movement, there was a short biography of Lelewel. Also found in Krasovsky's possession were the banned poems of Aleksei Khomiakov, Nikolai Nekrasov, Petr Viazemskii, Alexander Pushkin and Pierre-Jean de Béranger.

⁴⁹ Antonovych was known under this name in the 1870s. See *Arkhiv Myhaila Drahomanova* (Warsaw: Ukraïns'kyi Naukovyi Instytut, 1937) 428.

⁵⁰ RGVIA, f. 801, Op. 80/21, 3^e otd. 2oi stol, delo 48, 1862, sv. 667, l. 502.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, l. 512 ("Poliakam-Rusynam", *Samostaine slovo*, No. 4); l. 520 (A. Stoianov, "Poliaki i russyny v Kievskom universitete", *Hromadnytsia*, No. 2). Stoianov expressed explicit sympathy for the Poles' struggle for liberty in the Kingdom of Poland.

⁵² *Ibidem*, l. 517-18 ("Polytychnyi Ohliad", *Hromadnytsia*, No. 2).

⁵³ *Ibidem*, l. 526 ("Deshchytsia pro nedil'ni shkoly", *Samostaine slovo*, No. 1).

Krasovsky was tried in a court-martial and his case was reported to the Minister of War, Dmitrii Miliutin. Alexander II then commuted the original death sentence to twelve years of hard labour. His case alarmed those imperial politicians who did not support Vasilchikov's policy of playing off Ukrainians against Poles.

The Polish Intrigue Theory of the Origin of Ukrainian Nationalism: Fiction and Forgery

In 1862, the imperial authorities began to construct the myth of the Ukrainian movement as a Polish creation. At first, it was intended more for internal circulation within government circles than for the wider public. It was used as an argument for repressive policies against Ukrainians and against those imperial politicians like Vasilchikov, who supported softer policies in this regard. The authorities also forged evidence to back the myth. There exist two known cases in which the authorities blamed Ukrainian activists for acts they had never committed.

Volodymyr Miiakovsky discovered the pretext on the basis of which Pavlo Chubynsky was deported to Pinega in Arkhangelsk gubernia – he was accused of having authored the proclamation “To All Good People”, which called peasants to armed insurrection⁵⁴. In 1862, Chubynsky graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of St Petersburg and moved to Boryspil, Poltava province, near Kyiv. On 29 June 1862, Dmitrii Miliutin forwarded a denunciation against the Kyiv Ukrainophiles to Dolgorukov⁵⁵. Its author was Count Sivers. He had visited the city and there noticed the high visibility of Ukrainian orientation and national dress. Krasovsky had then just been court-martialled. Sivers argued – correctly – that there was a connection between Krasovsky and the “Society of Khlopomans” (peasant-lovers), as he called the Kyiv Hromada. Dolgorukov forwarded this information to Alexander II. In his letter, Sivers included an additional anonymous denunciation, which claimed that Kyiv Ukrainophiles were aiming for Ukraine's independence and acting in concert with the Polish underground, attempting to incite peasants against the existing order. The denunciation was clearly written by someone who was not satisfied with Vasilchikov's policy regarding the Hromada. Indeed, this unsubstantiated denunciation was the first one to argue the dangers

⁵⁴ V. M i j a k o v s ' k y, *Nedrukovane i zabute: Hromads'ki rukhy dev'iatnadtsiatoho storichchia* (New York: Ukraïns'ka vil'na Akademiia Nauk, 1984) 228, 233-4, 244-5, 335-42.

⁵⁵ GARF, f. 109, 1-ia eksp., Op. 37, 1862, ed. khr. 230, ch. 38, ll. 2-5 (Sivers's denunciation, 21 June 1862, and another, undated and anonymous one; both texts are published in full in F. S a v c h e n k o, *Zaborona Ukraïnstva 1876r.* (Kyiv: Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukraïny, 1930) 183-5; Savchenko finds that the anonymous denunciation was also written by Sivers); see also M i l l e r, *The Ukrainian Question*, 97. Both Savchenko and Miller emphasize the importance of this correspondence to the enactment of the Valuev Circular.

of Ukrainian-Polish revolutionary cooperation. The same denunciation claimed that Chubynsky had carried out agitation among the peasants of Poltava province.

In fall 1862, Gendarme Colonel Belov informed the Third Section from Poltava that Chubynsky and a handful of other people had visited a village, where they recounted some legends of Ukraine's past liberty to peasants⁵⁶. The peasants attempted to arrest the men, but they escaped. Although Governor Volkov ordered a secret investigation, no evidence against Chubynsky was found⁵⁷. The only reliable information was that Chubynsky and other young men mixed socially with peasants and drank vodka with them. Despite this, Belov suspected Chubynsky of subversive intentions against the existing order. Finally, Belov produced the handwritten proclamation "To All Good People" and claimed that Chubynsky was suspected of being its author⁵⁸. The proclamation incited peasants to insurrection on the grounds that all land was theirs, including land that had remained in the possession of noble landowners after the emancipation. The fact that the author asked his readers to bide their time, points to the document's possible Polish origin. Peasant disturbances on the left bank would have benefited the insurgents by diverting Russian troops. However, Fedir Savchenko was correct in noting the possibility that the gendarmes themselves might have written the proclamation⁵⁹. In fact, this is the most likely explanation. The author of the proclamation refers to large fires that had caused extensive damage in the summer of 1862. He claims that among the arsonists were landlords that wanted to destroy the peasants economically, and the enemies of landlords who burned down only landlord villages. The peasants were urged not to pay any heed to the latter, because these actions were directed only against the landlords; their real enemies. It is extremely unlikely that the Polish insurgents would have found it advantageous to defend arson in a text aimed at a peasant audience. It was the Russian authorities, not the Polish insurgents, who connected the fires with the Polish and radical Russian underground⁶⁰. Furthermore, the lack of any information about the proclamation's provenance in the files of the Third Section is

⁵⁶ GARF, f. 109, 1-ia eksp., Op. 37, 1862, ed. khr. 230, ch. 38, l. 13-16 (Colonel Belov to Dolgorukov, 28 July 1862, and Lieutenant Vasilev to Dolgorukov, 20 September 1862); Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 186-8.

⁵⁷ GARF, f. 109, 1-ia eksp., Op. 37, 1862, ed. khr. 230, ch. 38, l. 17-23 (Valuev to Dolgorukov, 6 October 1862; the letter includes a copy of the records of the secret police investigation).

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*, l. 24-6 (Belov to Dolgorukov, 7 September 1862); the proclamation is published in full in Mijakovs'kyi, *Nedrukovane*, 244-5 and Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 350-1.

⁵⁹ Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 190. Savchenko did not pass definite judgment on the question, leaving the resolution up to future researchers.

⁶⁰ F. Venturi, *Roots of Revolution: A History of the Populist and Socialist Movements in Nineteenth Century Russia*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960), 300-1.

striking. There is no information where, how, and when it was found, except for a statement that Chubynsky or his friends were suspected. Normally, the gendarmes were interested in details when they wished to find out the truth. Finally, Belov's letter, which contained the proclamation, seems to have been back-dated to 7 September 1862. In the Third Section file, it is located after Valuev's information about the results of the police investigation, dated 6 October 1862. Furthermore, on orders from Belov, his superior, Gendarme Lieutenant Vasilev, forwarded information about Chubynsky to the Third Section on 20 September. Vasilev's letter did not mention the proclamation. If the Poltava gendarmes had the proclamation in their possession on 7 September, it is puzzling that they wrote to the Third Section on 20 September without making any reference to it. Furthermore, Chubynsky's case was investigated by the Commission for the Investigation of Political Crimes, headed by Aleksandr Golitsyn. Contrary to its usual practice, the commission recommended Chubynsky's deportation without questioning him or trying to gain any additional information⁶¹. All this indicates that the gendarmes were the authors of Chubynsky's proclamation. Chubynsky's deportation was only revoked in 1869.

In December 1862, the Ukrainians lost their strongest support in Kyiv – Vasilchikov had died unexpectedly. The January Uprising began in the Kingdom of Poland on 10 (22) January 1863. By April it had spread to Ukraine, and battles were fought as far eastwards as Kyiv province. The authorities used the insurrection as a pretext to strike not only at Poles, but also Ukrainian activists. The secret investigation of Chubynsky had exposed other Ukrainian national activists who were placed under secret police surveillance. Among them was a secondary school student named Volodymyr Syniehub. On 28 January 1863, Dolgorukov wrote a strongly worded letter to Vasilchikov's successor, Nikolai Nikolaevich Annenkov, in which he informed the newly appointed governor-general about the existence of the Hromada, a secret society that – according to Dolgorukov – was in contact with Polish regional organizations at the university⁶². Dolgorukov ordered Annenkov to put an end to the society's activities. Thus, Vasilchikov's death had an impact on government policy – instead of being the government's allies against the Polish underground, Ukrainian activists in Kyiv were now suspected of siding with the Poles. In early March, Dolgorukov reinforced his position by sending Annenkov a copy of an anonymous denunciation, in which the planned translation of the gospels was considered a part of a campaign to separate Ukraine from Russia, and join it in federation with Poland. The denunciation was not what

⁶¹ GARF, f. 109, 1-ia eksp., Op. 37, ed. khr. 230, ch. 38, l. 29 (Golitsyn to Dolgorukov, 29 October 1862).

⁶² GARF, f. 109, 1-ia eksp., Op. 37, 1862, ed. khr. 230, ch. 38, l. 41.

caused the government's attack on the Ukrainian national movement. Dolgorukov had adopted a hostile position to Ukrainians as early as October 1862, at the time of Chubynsky's deportation⁶³.

Annenkov replied on 23 February, hesitating to use repression as a tool against the Ukrainian national activists⁶⁴. However, a month later, the governor-general yielded to Third Section pressure and became an adherent of repression. On 17 March, Annenkov sent another letter to Dolgorukov, in which he denied that the Ukrainian activists had acted in unison with the Poles – quite the contrary, they were opposed to “Latin-Polish propaganda”⁶⁵. Nevertheless, he agreed with the anonymous denunciator that political, rather than religious, motives were behind the planned translation of the Bible. In the event that the adherents of the Little Russian party had their translation of the Bible published, they would then demand autonomy on the grounds that they had their own language. Annenkov asked Dolgorukov to present this opinion to Alexander II, which he did on 27 March. The path forward to the Valuev Circular was now paved by Dolgorukov's cooperation with Valuev and Annenkov.

Volodymyr Syniehub and his friend, the young nobleman Volodymyr Pylypenko, were arrested on 26 April, in the village of Pylypchi in Poltava province. They were accused of recruiting members for a rebel unit to side with the Poles. Because of the Kyiv Polish students' short-lived insurgent campaign at the same time, the timing was apposite for such an accusation. After their arrest, Syniehub and Pylypenko soon revealed the identities of others involved, including the local landowner Viktor Pototsky and his brother Leonid. At first, Syniehub and Pylypenko admitted their guilt. Syniehub confessed that Andrii Krasovsky had recruited him into the Little Russian Revolutionary Committee, which sided with the Poles. According to witness testimonies, Syniehub and his associates had mixed socially with young peasant men in order to recruit them into the secret insurrectionary society. However, the major discrepancy between the various testimonies and uncovered evidence was striking: the authorities found only one gun, owned by Pototsky – a typical possession for a noble landowner to have in his household. Furthermore, the testimonies were far-fetched. According to Syniehub, he had planned to set fire to a village and murder all the local nobles in the event that

⁶³ *Ibidem*, l. 42-4 (denunciation, 2 March 1863, and Dolgorukov to Annenkov, 4 March 1863); Cf. Miller, *The Ukrainian Question*, 98-9. According to Miller, Dolgorukov was more concerned about the social rather than the national aspect of Hromada activities. “Dolgorukov provided Annenkov with no tangible compromising evidence, thus excluding the menace of police persecution.” Considering Chubynsky's recent deportation and the arrest of Volodymyr Syniehub shortly afterwards, Miller's statement runs counter to the facts.

⁶⁴ GARF, f. 109, 1-ia eksp., Op. 37, 1862, ed. khr. 230, ch. 38, l. 45-7.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, l. 55-7.

the authorities discovered his plans. The peasants who were recruited had been urged to kill all the local landlords. Last but not least, Syniehub and Pylypenko's testimonies create the distinct impression that both men had frequently imbibed large quantities of vodka to such an extent, that they could not have had time or energy to devote to conspiracy⁶⁶.

The testimonies were bizarre, because much of their content had been fabricated by the authorities. To be sure, they also contained some real information. Bohdan Klid has shown that the young men had indeed sung revolutionary songs, like Anatoly Svydnytsky's *U poli dolia stoiala* (In the Field Fate Awaited) and Chubynsky's *Shche ne vmerla Ukraina* (Ukraine Has Not Yet Died), which is Ukraine's national anthem today⁶⁷. However, it is not certain whether Syniehub and Pylypenko really sang these songs to the peasants. What in fact took place was that the young Ukrainophile noblemen mixed socially with the peasants, drank vodka with them, and sang folk songs, possibly also revolutionary songs. This was not an insurrection or conspiracy, and no Little Russian Revolutionary Committee ever existed.

In June 1863, Syniehub and Pylypenko wrote to Governor Volkov. Retracting their confessions, they claimed that the interrogators had threatened them, made false promises, and forced them to confess to things that had never taken place⁶⁸. Volkov's reaction is not recorded in the files of the Kyiv governor-general, which I consulted. The authorities most likely ignored the two men's complaints, refusing to contemplate any retraction. The arrestees were taken to St Peter and Paul Fortress in St Petersburg, and the investigation was continued by the Commission for the Investigation of Political Crimes. In early 1864, they were sent to Kyiv, because their original confessions – now rejected by the accused – involved so many locals. In January 1865, Aleksandr Pavlovich Bezak replaced Annenkov as governor-general. After familiarizing himself with the details of the case, Bezak found it essentially fabricated. In his letter to Third Section, he rejected the claim that Ukrainians had acted together with Poles:

The investigation has not revealed any information that would confirm that this party, known here as Ukrainophiles (*khokhlomanov ili khlopomanov*), tried to separate Little Russia [from the empire] and cooperated for that purpose with the Poles. Indeed, it could not have even revealed any such information. According to intelligence that has been

⁶⁶ TsDIA Uk., f. 442, Op. 813, od. zb. 541, ark. 156-86 (report of the Kyiv investigating commission, 22 March 1865; it includes Pylypenko and Syniehub's confessions following their arrest in 1863; the whole report is on ark. 156-309).

⁶⁷ B. Klid, "Songwriting and Singing: Ukrainian Revolutionary and not so Revolutionary Activities in the 1860s", *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 33/34 (Summer 2008-Winter 2009): 263-77.

⁶⁸ TsDIA Uk., f. 442, Op. 813, od. zb. 541, ark. 215-17 (report of the investigating commission, including extensive quotations from Syniehub and Pylypenko's letters to Volkov).

gathered by the local administration at different times, Ukrainophile activities differed from Polish tendencies. The first group argued for the uniqueness (*samobytnost'*) of the South Russian region and strove to instruct common people in the countryside in South Russian national principles. Poles argued that this region is Polish and tried to teach the common people in Polish, in order to plant in them the idea of their purported Polish nationality [...]⁶⁹.

Bezak released the accused and proposed to punish only Syniehub for speaking of his political ideas to peasants. It took considerable perseverance on Bezak's part to have his proposal accepted and close the case without going to trial. Syniehub was eventually deported to Viatka⁷⁰.

Meanwhile, in July 1863, Petr Valuev sent out his circular restricting Ukrainian literature. The official procedure that gave rise to the circular is well known. Formally, it was the initiative of the Kyiv censor, Orest Markovich Novitskii, who sent an inquiry about the matter to the Main Administration of the Press on 27 June 1863. He suspected that Ukrainian separatism owed its origin to Polish intrigue. Contrary to facts, Novitskii went so far as to claim that most Ukrainian-language manuscripts submitted for censorship were authored by Poles. The Valuev Circular, which followed as a response to Novitskii's inquiry, was supported by Dolgorukov and endorsed by Alexander II. Among his other arguments, Valuev repeated Dolgorukov and Novitskii's Polish-intrigue theory regarding the origins of the Ukrainian national movement.

Like the Chubynsky and Syniehub cases, the Polish uprising offered a useful argument against the numerous opponents of the Valuev Circular within the government's own ranks. Both Dolgorukov and Valuev were perfectly aware that the Ukrainians' goals differed from those of the Polish independence movement. As the chairman of the Kyiv Censorship Committee, Novitskii knew that most Ukrainian manuscripts submitted to the committee were not authored by Poles – in 1862, only one Polish author, Paulin Świącicki, submitted a manuscript in Ukrainian to the censor in Kyiv. His poem, *In Memory of Taras Shevchenko*, was denied permission to be published, because the censors disapproved of its complaints about Ukraine's present situation, the expectation of improvements in that situation, and the excessive praise lavished on Shevchenko⁷¹. David Saunders

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, ark. 127, 129-30 (the complete text of Bezak's letter to Dolgorukov, dated 6 August 1865, is on ark. 126-31).

⁷⁰ *Ibidem*, ark. 135-46 (the Third Section's Nikolai Mezentsov to Bezak, 4 September 1865); ark. 327-30 (Bezak to Petr Aleksandrovich Shuvalov, head of the Third Section, 25 May 1866); ark. 332 (Shuvalov to Bezak, 5 June 1866); ark. 337 (Valuev to Bezak, 16 June 1866).

⁷¹ RGIA, f. 775, Op. 1, 1863, delo 188 (*O tsenzirovanii knig izdavaemykh dlia naroda na Maloros-siiskom narechii*); *ibidem*, f. 772, Op. 1, delo 5992 (records of Kyiv Censorship Committee for the

is correct in emphasizing the staged element in official statements concerning the Polish danger with regard to Ukrainian activities⁷².

Factual Ukrainian-Polish Political Contacts

If the authorities had waited a few months, they would not have needed to fabricate evidence of Ukrainian revolutionaries siding with Polish insurgents. The last and most serious case of Ukrainian involvement in revolutionary action came to the fore in July 1863, with the arrest of a young land surveyor and Ukrainian activist named Ivan Andrushchenko. He was arrested in Chernihiv and found in possession of hundreds of revolutionary leaflets. Andrushchenko's case indicates that the activities of the Russian secret revolutionary society, Land and Liberty overlapped with those of the Ukrainian Hromadas. Land and Liberty, was formed in late 1861 or early 1862, and was more or less active until the spring of 1864, when it disbanded. Although little is known about Land and Liberty, its members demanded the establishment of republican rule, civil freedoms, as well as land reform to benefit the peasantry and the independence of Poland.

While under arrest, Andrushchenko attempted to send letters to several persons through a fellow convict about to be released. In these letters, he informed of his arrest and advised the recipients to be cautious. However, the authorities discovered the letters and conducted searches of the recipients' homes. One of them was Vasyl Bilozersky, the editor of *Osnova*. The only item found of importance was a letter from a woman named Elizaveta Baranovskaia to a railway engineer, Hieronym Kieniewicz, one of the leaders of the Polish insurrection. Kieniewicz was the main initiator of the so-called "Kazan conspiracy", an attempt to organize an armed insurrection in that city in the spring of 1863, with the aid of Russian revolutionaries⁷³. The purpose of the Kazan uprising was to divert Russian forces from Poland, but the authorities uncovered the plan in April 1863. Kieniewicz only escaped arrest because he was not in Kazan at the time. Later, he was a member of the national underground government, but was arrested in June 1863 and executed⁷⁴.

The letter from Baranovskaia to Kieniewicz did not contain anything political. However, the author wrote that because she could not recall the number of his

year 1862, including the lists of all submitted manuscripts for January-May and all permitted books for the whole year; since the file includes records of the sessions even for the period from June to December, it is unlikely that they omit any rejected manuscripts.

⁷² Saunders, "Russia's Ukrainian Policy", 184-5.

⁷³ S. K i e n i e w i c z, *Powstanie styczniowe* (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1972), 336-7, 403; V e n t u r i, *Roots of Revolution*, 303-15.

⁷⁴ K i e n i e w i c z, *Powstanie*, 463.

house, she was sending the letter to Bilozersky. At the very least, this indicated that Bilozersky knew Kieniewicz. However, when questioned (but not actually under arrest), Bilozersky claimed that he did not understand how the letter had appeared among his papers, and suggested that Kieniewicz was his wife's acquaintance⁷⁵. While denying knowing anyone named Kieniewicz, Bilozersky later sent the authorities an additional explanation, claiming that his wife remembered the story of the letter, which she had received from Baranovskaia three or four years before the house search. She did not know any Kieniewicz either, and tried unsuccessfully to locate him in order to deliver the letter. She then promptly forgot all about the letter, which remained in their home⁷⁶. The explanation is utterly unconvincing because the wording of the letter indicates that it was sent through Bilozersky, who had to have been known by both the sender and the addressee, not through his wife. Nonetheless, the authorities did not proceed further with the case.

Following the Valuev Circular, Ukrainian cooperation with the government appeared rather unpromising. A cautious reorientation in the Hromada had taken place even before the promulgation of the Valuev Circular. Boris Poznansky, a Hromada member, recounted this in his memoirs, having heard from Antonovych about an agreement that the latter had concluded with the Polish insurgents⁷⁷. The Poles would leave Ukrainian activists in peace during their armed struggle and, in return, the Ukrainians would observe neutrality. The probable date for these negotiations was late 1862, or early 1863.

In the early months of 1864, correspondence took place between the Polish National Government and an enigmatic group called the Progressive Rusyn Hromada. Only the former's response, dated 23 February (N.S.), has been preserved and published.⁷⁸ Most likely it was drafted by the Polish National Government's secretary for Ruś (Right-bank Ukraine) and former Kyiv student, Marian Dubiecki. The Hromada proposed that Poland officially renounce its historical right to Ruś. A liberated Ruś would then join a federation with Poland, and the Hromada would be prepared to work for this goal. Stefan Kieniewicz presumed that the Progressive Rusyn Hromada was based in Lviv⁷⁹. However, it is much more likely that it was headquartered in Kyiv. The Polish National Government sent its answer

⁷⁵ GARF, f. 112, Op. 1, ed. khr. 73, l. 159 (Vasyl Bilozersky's interrogation, 25 September 1863); V. D u d k o, "Zhurnal 'Osnova' u zhandarms'kykh materialakh", *Spadshchyna: Literaturne dzhereloznavstvo. Tekstolohiia*, No. 2 (2006) 40, mentions this letter in passing.

⁷⁶ GARF. f. 112, Op. 1, ed. khr. 73, l. 177 (Vasyl Bilozersky's addendum to his testimony, 27 September 1863).

⁷⁷ B. P o z n a n s k i i, "Vospominaniia", *Ukrainskaia zhizn'* (1913) No. 5, 46.

⁷⁸ *Dokumenty komitetu centralnego narodowego i rządu narodowego 1862-1864* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Zakładu im. Ossolińskich, 1968), 327-38.

⁷⁹ K i e n i e w i c z, *Powstanie styczniowe*, 702.

to Antoni Chamieć, responsible for Right-bank Ukraine in the Russian Empire, not Galicia in Austria. From their answer, it follows that the Hromada proposed that the Polish National Government would renounce its claim to Ukraine only in relation to Ukrainians, but not in relation to Russia. In other words, they wanted Poland's supreme authority to demand Ukrainian territory from Russia, but at the same time grant self-determination to Ukraine⁸⁰. The territorial claim issue presented to Russia confirms the hypothesis that the discussion concerned Right-bank Ukraine, not Galicia. Furthermore, there are references to the "Muscovite occupation" of the country and Russian slander that the Poles wanted to retain the peasants' work obligations; statements that were not applicable to Galicia in 1864⁸¹. At issue here is a discussion between the National Government and either the Kyiv Hromada or, perhaps, one part of it.

Initiating negotiations with Polish insurgents after the demise of the insurrection in Right-bank Ukraine is not as strange as it may seem. The renunciation of Polish claims to Ukraine would indeed have been an important political victory. Such renunciation would not have lost its relevance even after the end of the insurrection. The Polish National Government was facing its complete demise and could be expected to offer concessions. However, the initiative of the Hromada to seek cooperation between Ukrainians and Poles did not produce the desired results. In its answer, the Polish National Government pointed to the Ukrainians' recent cooperation with the Russian authorities:

In general, the Rusin nationality did not enjoy the occupying power's recognition. Some minor concessions made for its benefit had a rather evident goal, although at first the Rusins [acted] as if they did not notice it – nationality was used as an instrument for the continuation of the occupation, as an obstacle for the Polish nationality, which strives for liberation [...]. Rusins should comprehend without difficulty that the antipathy that their movement has recently confronted resulted from the evident association of Rusin activities with the occupier's ugly plans. From the minute this connection ceases to function, all Polish antipathy to Rusin national activities will certainly disappear⁸².

The Polish National Government recognized the right of the Rusin nationality to its independent (*samodzielnego*) development, but refused to renounce Poland's historical territorial rights. In its view, the insurrection was not something alien to Ruś, inasmuch as it represented the interest of all three fraternal peoples (Poles, Lithuanians, and Rusins) that formed the ancient Polish Commonwealth. It acknowledged that because of ancient conflicts, historical enmity existed

⁸⁰ *Dokumenty komitetu*, 327.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*, 328, 330.

⁸² *Dokumenty komitetu*, 328-9.

between Rusins and Poles, both sides having made mistakes. However, in the face of oppression suffered by both Poles and Rusins at the time, there was no reason to remain bitter about the past, but all should unite in support of the National Government⁸³.

Although only one class of the Ruś population – the Polish nobility – participated in the insurrection, it still expressed internal-domestic needs. “This opinion is all the more well-argued when that class is enlightened and concentrates in its possession the most important material interests of the land”⁸⁴. Since conditions were such that elections could not be held anywhere in Poland, the right to speak in the name of the country belonged to those who acted in its interests. “On this principle, the National Government, not by force and usurpation, but with serious paternal and fraternal intention, considers itself the representative of the rightful interests and aims of Poland, as well as Lithuania and Ruś”⁸⁵. The word “paternal” appears to be a slip of the tongue. Finally, the Polish National Government presented the argument for restoration: “The partitions of Poland violated public morals and justice in political relations. Poland cannot be raised, except through the broadest execution of the principles of political and social justice”⁸⁶. The historical normative act concerning relations between Poland and Ruś was the Union of Lublin concluded in 1569, which the underground Polish government still considered binding.

The national government backed its historical arguments with practical considerations. Lines of communication and strategic factors made the unity of Poland and Ruś a necessity. Without its Polish population, Ruś would lack significant intellectual and material forces contributing to its development. Rusins themselves would notice this sooner or later, and return to their native Polish element (*żywiół*). If an anti-Polish movement resisting the union with Poland were to emerge within the pre-partition borders, the underground government would not attempt to utilize force to retain unity. Indeed, the government spoke about such a movement as hypothetical, as if deliberately ignoring the mainstream opinion of Ukrainian national activists. Furthermore, it declared that Rusins could not blame Poles for the fact that the 1772 borders had divided their nationality, because the blame belonged to those who had submitted the territories lying east of the Dniπρο to Moscow in the seventeenth century – a tacit reference to Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Finally, the National Government rejected the Hromada’s demand that Ruś be granted the status of a federal state. As a provisional body

⁸³ *Ibidem*, 329.

⁸⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁸⁶ *Ibidem*, 330.

struggling solely for independence, the underground government did not consider itself entitled to make a decision about such a settlement, although it promised autonomy to Ruś and the other lands of the Polish Commonwealth. Federation was possible later, if the Rusins joined Poles in their struggle for liberation of the common fatherland⁸⁷.

In the end, the Polish National Government was not capable of moving beyond the limits of Polish national mythology with respect to the pre-partition commonwealth. This prevented the conclusion of a Ukrainian-Polish agreement even it when the two prospective sides faced an overwhelming enemy: the Russian government. If the alliance with Vasilchikov had not produced the desired results, the Polish response to Progressive Rusyn Hromada's proposals showed that no better results could be expected from an alliance with the Poles.

The Kyiv Hromada and the Polish Question in the 1870s

The period of quiescence that ensued in the Ukrainian movement after the enactment of the Valuev Circular ended in the early 1870s, by which time the Imperial Russian Geographical Society began to offer a forum for lawful and public Ukrainian activities. After the Polish uprising of 1863, official Russian circles deplored the fact that most of the information about the western provinces was produced by Polish scholars and writers⁸⁸. Government circles sensed that after the military victory over the Poles, the empire also needed an intellectual and ideological victory⁸⁹. For this reason, they supported scholarly studies of the region that advanced the Russian viewpoint. In 1867, the Geographical Society launched an expedition to the western provinces. Ukrainian nationalism entered the project in the person of Pavlo Chubynsky, who was named a member of the expedition in May 1869, and assigned the task of studying the south-west region, that is, the provinces situated on the right bank of the Dnipro River. The Ukrainophiles' cooperation with the Imperial Russian Geographical Society was successful, borne out by the fact that the results of the expedition were published in seven volumes in 1872-1878⁹⁰. They contain legends, fairy tales, songs, and information about the popular calendar and customary law. The most interesting for us

⁸⁷ *Ibidem*, 336.

⁸⁸ V. Petronis, *Constructing Lithuania: Ethnic Mapping in Tsarist Russia, ca. 1800-1914* (Stockholm: University of Stockholm, 2007), 125-8.

⁸⁹ Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 28-9.

⁹⁰ *Trudy etnograficheskoi-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v zapadno-Russkii krai, snariazhennoi Imperatorskim Russkim Geograficheskim Obshchestvom. Iugo-Zapadnyi otdel. Materialy i issledovaniia, sobrannia d. chl. P.P. Chubinskim*, 7 Vols. (St Petersburg: Imperatorskoe Russkoe Geograficheskoe Obshchestvo, 1872-8).

is the seventh volume, which appeared in two parts in 1872 and 1877. It includes chapters about Jews, Poles, statistics, and a study of the Little Russian language. The chapters on Poles – published in 1872, which Chubynsky co-authored with Kost Mykhalchuk, a former Pole of the Orthodox confession from the right bank – indicate that Chubynsky stood on the Russian side in the Russo-Polish political conflict. The two authors identified local Poles with the nobility's social and political conservatism, as well as traditional Roman Catholicism. They criticized what they perceived as the imperial government's excessively soft policies towards the Poles in the period between the partitions and the 1830s. Indeed, Mykhalchuk later complained in his memoirs that Chubynsky had unilaterally exaggerated the negative characteristics of Right-bank Poles, thereby placing Mykhalchuk, as co-author, in an awkward position⁹¹.

Chubynsky and Mykhalchuk contrasted Russians favourably to Poles. While Poles represented reactionary adherence to a hierarchical society, Russians represented democracy: "Russian intellectual society (*intelligentskoe obshchestvo*) has always been democratic. In our literature, critical orientation and self-criticism, the striving to get rid of all kinds of romanticism, is rather well developed. Not incidentally, Russia is called a peasant state (*muzhitskim gosudarstvom*); its intelligentsia is closer to the people than in any other society"⁹². In the view of the expedition members, the Russian Empire represented democracy, progress, and positivism in the south-west region, while Poles represented an outdated hierarchical society, reaction, and romanticism. It is hardly necessary to emphasize how biased the images of Poland and Russia were in this perception. Chubynsky's generalizations were coherent with the tone of official discourse of the western provinces in the 1860s, a topic that has since been studied by Mikhail Dolbilov⁹³.

It seems that the Kyiv Hromada mainstream did not support Chubynsky's anti-Polish position, but held a somewhat more balanced view. In 1875, the Hromada controlled the Russian-language newspaper *Kievskii Telegraf* for several months. Despite its generally moderate tone, *Kievskii Telegraf* published numerous texts in which imperial government policies were explicitly criticized, including a few texts which discussed the Polish question. In the article "The Polish Question here and in Poznan", the editors proposed a softening of policies with regard to Poles. They argued that the political question of belonging to Russia had been solved in the Kyiv region for good in 1863. Here, the Polish question existed only

⁹¹ "Nevidomyi avtobiohrafichnyi Lyst K. Mykhal'chuka. (Z arkhivu Iv. Steshenka)", *Ukraina* 24, No. 5 (1927): 64; *Trudy etnograficheskoi-statisticheskoi*, Vol. 7, 215, 220-2; S a v c h e n k o, *Zaborona ukraїnstva*, 29-32, 106-8.

⁹² *Trudy etnograficheskoi-statisticheskoi* 7: 271.

⁹³ M. D o l b i l o v, "The Stereotype of the Pole in Imperial Policy: The 'Depolonization' of the Northwestern Region in the 1860s", *Russian Studies in History* 44, No. 2 (Fall 2005): 44-88.

among Poles – would they work for the good of local Russian people, or would they retain their “old dreams”? The editorialist added that Russians were able to help the reorientation of local Poles by developing all-estate institutions, religious tolerance, equal rights for Orthodox and Catholics in education, and tolerance for the Polish culture in the private sphere. This was indeed frank criticism of the policies that the government practised in relation to Poles, who were discriminated against on the basis of their religious confession. By the creation of all-estate institutions, the editors meant *zemstvo* reform, which had not been introduced in Right-bank Ukraine. Furthermore, the editors also criticized Russian government policies in the Kingdom of Poland. According to them, “a centralist policy has been attempted which resembles that of the (French revolutionary) Convent in Alsace and Prussian policies in the Poznan region”⁹⁴. They pointed to the awkward situation in which the Russian government found itself as, concomitantly with these Polish policies, the imperial authorities advocated the liberation of fellow Slavs in the Ottoman Empire. The editorial concludes with a sympathetic description of the Poles’ struggle against German pressure in the Poznan region of Prussia. German policies, the editorialists claimed, had led many Poles to seek a rapprochement with Russia. The editors then promised to discuss recent Polish proposals for this Polish-Russian rapprochement. This promise never materialized.

The Ukrainian national movement emerged in opposition to both Poland and Russia, the two historically dominant nations in the region that the Ukrainian activists claimed as their national territory. In the Ukrainian-Polish-Russian triangle, Ukrainian national activists did not develop a consistent orientation, but – according to circumstances – either allied themselves with the government, or criticized the government for their oppression of Poland, as well as Ukraine. Ukrainian-Polish revolutionary co-operation existed, but only as a minority current within the Ukrainian movement. It was of more importance as a Russian myth.



⁹⁴ “Pol’skii vopros u nas i v Poznani”, *Kievskii Telegraf*, 10 February 1875, 1-2.

STRESZCZENIE

Johannes REMY, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w imperium rosyjskim a Polska w latach 1840–1870*

Poparcie dla ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego zwiększyło się i uzyskało charakter jednoznacznie polityczny w kręgach inteligenckich imperium rosyjskiego w drugim trzdziestoleciu XIX w. Ruch ten wynikał z opozycji wobec Rosjan i Polaków, dwóch narodowości tradycyjnie dominujących na Ukrainie, które miały rozwiniętą własną kulturę wysoką. Władze rosyjskie najpierw wahały się w stosunku do ruchu ukraińskiego: jedni politycy chcieli użyć Ukraińców przeciw Polakom, inni popierali represje wobec Ukraińców. W niniejszym artykule autor przedstawia co ukraińscy aktywiści myśleli o Polsce i Polakach oraz jak władze rosyjskie postrzegały stosunki między polskim ruchem wyzwolenicznym i ukraińskim ruchem narodowym.

Pierwszym ukraińskim spiskiem politycznym można nazwać Towarzystwo św. Cyryla i Metodego, które władze zlikwidowały w 1847 r. Wielu historyków już badało jego działalność. Należy podkreślić, że polski wpływ ideowy na Towarzystwo był bardzo istotny: jego kluczowy dokument programowy, *Prawo Boga*, był adaptacją *Ksiąg narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* Adama Mickiewicza, choć z pewnymi zmianami, np. z dodaniem nacisku na znaczenie wszystkich narodów słowiańskich w ogólnej zmianie świata. Towarzystwo dążyło do federacji republikańskiej wszystkich krajów słowiańskich, dlatego spiskowcy nie dawali pierwszeństwa ani Rosji ani Polsce, chcąc być razem z obydwoma. Jednak Jurij Andruzky, szeregowy członek towarzystwa, skłaniał się raczej ku Polsce niż Rosji. Napisał wiersz *Liashchenku, liashche*, w którym zapraszał Polaków do wspólnej wyzwolenczej walki zbrojnej. W 1850 r., już po deportacji Andruzkiego do Pietrozadowa, władze znalazły u niego plan federacji wschodnioeuropejskiej bez Rosji. Federacja ta raczej nie była słowiańska, bo zrzeszała Ukrainę, Polskę, Mołdawię, Bułgarię, Serbię, Estonię, Łotwę, Litwę oraz Don.

Po wstąpieniu na tron Aleksandra II wszyscy członkowie Towarzystwa św. Cyryla i Metodego zostali ułaskawieni. Spośród nich Mykoła Kostomarow, Pantelejmon Kulisz i Wasyl Biłozerski kontynuowali swoją działalność w ruchu ukraińskim. W 1857 r. Kulisz napisał i wydał *Gramatykę (Грамматка)*, pierwszy elementarz we współczesnym języku ukraińskim. Początkowe rozdziały zostały napisane na podstawie tekstów biblijnych, a od siódmej lekcji w ćwiczenia do czytania włączano materiał z ukraińskich pieśń ludowych, które opowiadały o wojnach kozackich przeciw Polakom. Kulisz pisał do nich objasnienia w bardzo nacionalistycznym duchu. Reagując na donosy polskich ziemian, generał-gubernator kijowski Ilarion Wasilczikow, zwrócił uwagę na książkę Kulisza i uznał ją za niebezpieczną dla pokoju społecznego. Wasilczikow nie dostrzegał niczego korzystnego w antypolskiej orientacji Kulisza. Obawiał się natomiast, że *Gramatyka* może inspirować włóścian do niepokońcości wobec ziemian, albo nawet buntów przeciw nim. W związku z tym Wasilczikow zabronił używać *Gramatki* w guberniach na zachód od Dniepru. Uważał on jednak książkę za niebezpieczną wyłącznie w guberniach, w których ziemiaństwo stanowili Polacy, a więc już nie na wschód od tej rzeki. Ten wypadek pokaże, że w 1857 r. Wasilczikow jeszcze nie był zaniepokojony polskim ruchem wyzwolenicznym, wobec czego ukraińską antypolską literaturę postrzegał jako szkodliwą.

Na początku 1861 r. ukraińscy nacjonałiści powołali czasopismo „Osnowa”. Były członek Towarzystwa św. Cyryla i Metodego Wasyl Biłozerski został jego redaktorem naczelnym. Pisano tam często na temat stosunków politycznych ukraińsko-rosyjsko-polskich. „Osnowa” kontynuowała orientację byłego towarzystwa, bo popierała formację federacji słowiańskiej. Co prawda, Ukraińcy zwracali już mniej uwagi na inne kraje słowiańskie, ciekawił ich przede wszystkim własny kraj, Rosja i Polska. Ze względu na cenzurę nie można było pisać o tych sprawach całkiem otwarcie, ale nie trudno było zrozumieć zamiary autorów. W szczególności, Mykoła Kostomarow wyrażał na łamach „Osnowy” poglądy polityczne w swoich badaniach historiograficznych. W artykule „Hetmaństwo Wyhowskiego” Kostomarow badał dzieje hetmana kozackiego, który układał z Polską umowę hadziacką. Miała ona włączyć Ukrainę w federację Polski z Litwą. Według Kostomarowa polityka Moskwy, przede wszystkim lekceważenie obyczajów regionalnych na Ukrainie, presja aby uczynić Cerkiew podwładną Moskwy, a także ograniczenie autonomii ukraińskiej, doprowadziły do unii hadziackiej. Kostomarow zacytował w swoim artykule kilka przemówień Wyhowskiego, które

zawierały ostrą krytykę polityki moskiewskiej. Redaktorzy czasopisma wyraźnie popierali orientację federalistyczną Kostomarova, podkreślając że Moskwa też miała wstąpić do unii hadziackiej. Jednak, według opinii wyrażanej na łamach „Osnowy”, egoizm szlachty polskiej zniszczył naturalny kierunek rozwoju Europy Wschodniej. Redaktorzy wyrażali przy tym nadzieję, że w przyszłości będzie możliwe odwołanie się do idei unii hadziackiej. Tak pisała „Osnowa” w kwietniu 1861 r., kiedy manifestacje w Warszawie wyrażały sprzeciw wobec polityki imperatorskiej.

Kostomarov pisał też o współczesnej sytuacji Polski, nie zgadzając się z ruchem wyzwolenczym, bo uważał, że kierunek rozwoju winien iść włączenie ku zjednoczeniu Słowian, a nie w stronę ich separacji. W artykule *Odpowiedź twierdzeniom „Revue contemporaine” i „Czasu”* Kostomarov odrzucił polskie żądania terytorialne na terytorium uważanym za ukraińskie. Cenzorzy chcieli zabronić druku tego artykułu aby nie drażnić Polaków. Kiedy Kostomarov ubiegał się u cenzury o możliwość publikacji, wyraźnie pisał, że jest przeciwnikiem niepodległości Polski. Wreszcie jego artykuł ukazał się drukiem. Choć Kostomarov w argumentacji z cenzorami podkreślał swoją lojalność wobec imperium, jego orientacja nie była identyczna z polityką rządową. W marcu 1861 r. Kostomarov uczestniczył w mszy żałobnej za zabitych w Warszawie manifestantów, dobrze zdając sobie sprawę, że była to jednocześnie demonstracja polityczna. W lutym tego samego że roku „Osnowa” opublikowała opis podróży po Ukrainie, który zawierał delikatną krytykę polityki rządowej wobec Polski. Podróżnicy zwiedzały były klasztor jezuicki, ruiny którego teraz służyły za kwatery wojska rosyjskiego. Widok ten zrobił na podróżnym nieprzyjemne wrażenie. Mimo tego nieco później „Osnowa” opublikowała dwa artykuły o ostrej antypolskiej zawartości. Ich autorami byli Tadeusz Ryłski i Włodzimierz Antonowicz, młodzi kijowscy aktywiści, którzy niedługo przed tym przeszli na stronę ukraińską z polskiego ruchu wyzwolenczego. Szczególnie Antonowicz pisał z wrogością o polskich szlachcicach na Ukrainie, proponując im tylko dwie alternatywy: albo stać się mieli Ukraińcami i pracować dla dobra ukraińskiego ludu, albo wyjechać do Polski.

Książka Pantelejmona Kulisz *Chmelnyszczyna (Хмельницщина)* przyczyniła się do jeszcze jednego procesu cenzorskiego, w którym władze musiały razem rozważać kwestie ukraińską i polską. W swojej książce Kulisz prezentował czytelnikowi słabo wykształconemu historię powstania Bohdana Chmielnickiego. Cenzor Beketow zastanawiał się, czy w ogóle można zezwolić na prace historyczne o częściach imperium rosyjskiego, które wcześniej należały do oddzielnych państw. Beketow nie chciał sam decydować w tej kwestii, ale przedłożył ją wobec kolegium. Główna administracja cenzury delegowała tę sprawę do cenzora Aleksandra Nikitenki, profesora literatury rosyjskiej, z pochodzenia włościanina z Ukrainy. Nikitenko uznał za możliwe, aby zezwolić na prace historyczne poświęcone częściom byłych niepodległych państw. Jego zdaniem należało jednak w takich książkach zwracać uwagę na możliwość pojawienia się tendencji separatystycznych, na które nie wolno pozwolić. Zdanie Nikitenki wywoływało niemal powstanie okólnika przeciw pracom historycznym o treści separatystycznej. Dyrektor głównej administracji cenzury, Nikołaj Muchanow, miał już gotowy okólnik z instrukcjami dla cenzorów w tej sprawie, jednak w lutym 1861 r. rozkazał go zniszczyć. Najbardziej wiarygodnym powodem na odwołanie okólnika są wypadki warszawskie: Kulisz pisał bardzo ostro o Polakach i w nowej sytuacji politycznej Muchanow w porę dostrzegł, że orientacja antypolska może być korzystna dla władzy.

Najważniejszą organizacją działaczy ukraińskich w 1860 r. była Kijowska Hromada, która rozpoczęła swoją działalność jako towarzystwo studenckie. Hromada zjednoczyła studentów o orientacji ukraińskiej z obydwu brzegów Dniepru. Wpływ osób polskiego pochodzenia, szczególnie Włodzimierza Antonowicza, był w Hromadzie bardzo istotny. Początkowo demokratyczne zorientowani młodzi Polacy starali się łączyć ukraińską identyfikację narodową z działaniem na rzecz polskości poprzez uczestniczenie w polskim ruchu wyzwolenczym. Jednak miejscowa szlachta ostro krytykowała radykalizm społeczny i ukraińską orientację młodych polskich patriotów. W lutym 1861 r. donosy od szlachty powodowały przeszukiwanie mieszkań Antonowicza i Ryłskiego oraz ich przesłuchanie. Antonowicz otwarcie opowiadał o swojej ukraińskiej orientacji i podkreślał wrogość polskiej szlachty wobec tych zasad. Komisja śledcza oceniała pozytywnie ukrainofilstwo studentów. Choć komisja znalazła u Antonowicza regulamin polskich powstańców, napisany przez Ludwika Mierosławskiego, nie badała jego stosunków z polskimi tajnymi towarzystwami. Dokumenty komisji na temat przesłuchania Antonowicza nie zawierają żadnej informacji o polskich spiskach. Komisja proponowała, żeby Antonowicz i jego towarzysze pisali

w czasopiśmie o swoich poglądach, zgodnie z którymi terytorium na zachód od Dniepru nie jest polskie, a ukraińskie. Komisja poleciła, żeby połączyli swoją działalność z państwową Komisją dla Przeglądu Akt Dawnych w Kijowie. Wnioski i zalecenia komisji przyczyniły się do współpracy Hromady z generał-gubernatorem. Antypolskie artykuły Antonowicza i Rylskiego w „Osnowie” były wynikami niepisanej umowy, którą Hromada zawierała wtedy z Wasilczikowem. W 1863 r. Antonowicz dołączył się do prac Komisji dla Przeglądu Akt Dawnych, a Wasilczikow wstrzymał się od represji wobec ruchu ukraińskiego. W polityce studenckiej, w szczególności podczas polskich demonstracji patriotycznych w Kijowie jesienią 1861 r., Hromada sprzeciwiała się polskiemu ruchowi wyzwolenczemu.

Mimo umowy i współpracy z Wasilczikowem, pomysły rewolucyjne też miały poparcie w Hromadzie Kijowskiej. Władze uznały to po aresztowaniu podpułkownika Andrzeja Krasowskiego, który agitował żołnierzy aby nie podporządkowywać się rozkazowi stłumienia zamieszek włościańskich na Kijowszczyźnie. U Krasowskiego znaleźli różne dokumenty, które pokazały, że solidaryzował się on z polskim ruchem wyzwolenczym. Z dokumentów ukraińskich najbardziej istotne były czasopisma, napisane odrębnie przez członków Hromady, „Samostajne Slowo” i „Hromanytsia”. Jeden z autorów pisał o niepodległości Ukrainy jako celu długoterminowym. Najprawdopodobniej był nim Antonowicz. Bardzo przychylnie pisał on też o radykałach rosyjskich. Mimo że wielu autorów w obydwu czasopiśmie ostro krytykowało polski ruch niepodległościowy, sprzeciwiali się oni polskiemu ruchowi tylko na Ukrainie, zaś nawet solidaryzowali się z nim w Królestwie Polskim. Ta informacja była bardzo niepokojąca dla wielu polityków rosyjskich, którzy postrzegać zaczęli politykę Wasilczikowa wobec Ukraińców jako niebezpieczną. Krasowskiego osądzono na karę śmierci, ale Aleksander II zmienił wyrok na 14 lat pracy przymusowej.

Po wyroku Krasowskiego, zwolennicy represjonowania aktywistów ukraińskich na wyższych szczeblach biurokracji państwowej rozpoczęli kampanię, która w lipcu 1863 r. doprowadziła (w okólniku Wałujewa) do zabronienia druku literatury ukraińskiej jedynie poza fikcją. Zwolennikami represji byli minister wojenny Dmitrij Miliutin, szef III Oddziału Kancelarii Osobistej Jego Cesarskiej Mości Wasilij Dołgoruki i Piotr Wałujew. Ich pierwszym zadaniem stała się kompromitacja polityki przychylnego Ukraińcom Wasilczikowa. Aby osiągnąć ten cel, nie hamowali się oni nawet przed fałszowaniem faktów. Najważniejszy argument dla represji wobec Ukraińców - kwestia współpracy z polskim ruchem niepodległościowym - nie był zgodny z prawdą. Po raz pierwszy stwierdzenie to pojawiło się w anonimowym donosie, który Dołgorukow przekazał carowi w czerwcu 1862 r. W październiku tego samego roku ukraiński aktywista Paweł Czubyński został aresztowany w guberni połtawskiej i deportowany do guberni archangielskiej. Oskarżono go o pisanie i rozpowszechnianie odezwy, która nawoływała włościan do powstania przeciw ziemianom. Wypadek ten miał udowodnić, że Ukraińcy uczestniczą w przygotowaniu powstania wspólnie z Polakami. Zdaniem autora artykułu odezwa była fałszywa. Czubińskiego zwolniono z deportacji dopiero w 1869 r.

W grudniu 1862 r. Ilarion Wasilczikow niespodziewanie zmarł. Ukraińcy utracili w ten sposób wpływowe poparcie. W styczniu, po rozpoczęciu polskiego powstania, Dołgorukow pisał do nowego generał-gubernatora Mikołaja Annenkowa, nakazując zakończyć działalność spisku pod nazwą „Hromada”. Szef żandarmów twierdził, że Hromada współpracuje z polskimi towarzyszami studenckimi. Najpierw Annenkow się wahał, bo dobrze wiedział, że Hromada nie popierała polskiego powstania. Jednak w marcu poddał się on presji Dołgorukowa i zgodził na ograniczenie praw do druku literatury ukraińskiej. Nawet wtedy Annenkow odrzucał tezę o ukraińsko-polskiej współpracy rewolucyjnej, uważał natomiast ruch ukraiński za niebezpieczny, bo w przyszłości mógłby wymagać autonomii.

W końcu kwietnia 1863 r. władze aresztowały w guberni połtawskiej Wołodymyra Syniehuba, członka Hromady, młodego szlachcica Wołodymyra Pilipenkę wraz z kilkoma innymi osobami. Oskarżono ich o podburzanie włościan do powstania przeciw ziemianom. Czas był jak najbardziej adekwatny dla takiego oskarżenia, bo polscy studenci tego samego dnia rozpoczęli swoją kampanię powstańczą w guberni kijowskiej. Najpierw Syniehub i inni aresztowani przyznali się do winy. Według zeznania Syniehuba, Krasowskij zwerbował go do spisku pod nazwą Małorosyjski Komitet Rewolucyjny. Wydali oni też wiele innych osób. Jednak już w czerwcu Syniehub i Pilipenko pisali do gubernatora Połtawskiego, że odwołują swoje oświadczenia, twierdząc iż

zostali przymuszeni zarówno groźbami jak i obietnicami. Gubernator nie reagował jednak na list oskarżonych, których potem przesłuchano także w Petersburgu. Wiosną 1864 r. przesłano ich do Kijowa, bowiem w pierwszych zeznaniach wspominali o mieszkańcach tego miasta. Generał-gubernatorem kijowskim był wtedy Aleksander Bezak. Po zapoznaniu się z materiałami sprawy Bezak doszedł do wniosku, że była ona sfalszowana i polityczny spisek nie istniał. Zwolnił on wszystkich aresztowanych i zaproponował ukarać tylko Syniehuba, ponieważ on właśnie rozmawiał o swoich pomysłach politycznych z włościanami. Deportowano go następnie do Wiatki. Sprawy Chubinskiego i Syniehuba posłużyły ostatecznie jako argument do represji w wydawaniu literatury ukraińskiej.

