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ATAMAN SEMENOV'S SECRET LIFE

ATAMAN GRIGORII MIKHAILOVICH SEMENOV, 1890–1946, is a well-known Baikal Cossack leader. Of Mongol/Buryat origin on his father's side, Semenov distinguished himself in battles against the Central Powers during World War One. According to the official story, he refused to accept the success of the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 and worked with the Imperial Japanese Army, which, along with other imperial powers (including the United States), intervened in the Russian Civil War in the Far East. In the end, Semenov and his military forces were defeated by the Reds and forced to emigrate. Semenov first moved to Japan and Manchuria, then to the United States, and then back to Japan and Manchuria where he was employed by the Japanese government.

Ataman Semenov was widely regarded as the chief of the Russian émigré community numbering in the tens of thousands and the White (anti-Soviet) movement in the Far East. As such, Semenov worked closely with the Japanese (which occupied Manchuria in 1931 and founded a puppet government, Manchukuo, in 1932). Towards the end of World War Two, when Moscow declared war against Japan, Semenov was caught by the invading Soviet military forces, taken to the Soviet Union and tried and hanged in Moscow¹. Such is the official story.

¹ See his autobiography G. S e m e n o v, *O sebe: vospominaniia, mysli i vyvody* (Harbin: Zaria, 1938; Moscow: AST-Geia Iterum, 1999), J. B i s h e r, *White Terror: Cossack Warlords of the Trans-Siberian* (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), and a recent Russian biography by A. S m i r n o v, *Kazach'i atamany: tragediia rossiiskogo kazachestva* (Spb: Neva, 2002), part one.

W jubileuszowych zeszytach nr 50 i 51 zamieszczamy wiele materiałów, pochodzących od autorów z różnych państw, ukazując przez to szerokie spektrum badań oraz poglądy i punkty widzenia badaczy różnych specjalności, różnych krajów, zwłaszcza naszego regionu. Tekstów tych redakcja zdecydowała nie poddawać zwyczajowemu w czasopismach naukowych opracowaniu, opiniowaniu i wewnętrznej naukowej dyskusji, pozostawiając odpowiedzialność za prezentowane stanowisko w rękach autorów (Red.).

Of Semenov's secret life nothing is known. As far as we can ascertain, there has been no discussion of it anywhere². There is evidence, however, that Semenov came to terms with the Soviet government as early as 1924 and that he began to work for Moscow from the mid-1930s, suggesting that Semenov was a Soviet agent, not an anti-Soviet émigré leader, as almost all historical literature contends. If this story is true, it has tremendous implications for the understanding of the history of the Far East in the period from the 1920s to the 1940s. After all, Semenov was familiar with almost all strategic plans of Imperial Japan towards China, Mongolia, and the Soviet Union and through him these plans would have become known to Moscow.

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Thanks to Dmitrii A. Volkogonov, 1928–1995, a well known biographer of the three famous Soviet political leaders, V.I. Lenin, I.V. Stalin, and L.D. Trotskii, several documents relevant to Semenov's secret life are available in the United States. A high-ranking military official, Volkogonov had unprecedented access to some formerly closed archives, including the archives of the Soviet Secret Police. Fortunately for historians, the documents he collected before his death in 1995, ended up in the United States Library of Congress where they are accessible to anyone interested in them³.

In the earliest document dating to 21 November 1924 and addressed to the then Soviet Ambassador Lev. M. Karakhan, 1889–1937, Semenov wrote long-hand:

To the Ambassador of the Soviet Union in China Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan,
Mr. Ambassador,

Hereby I inform you, to be conveyed to the Government, that, of my own free will, on account of my full recognition of my past anti-Soviet activity and [two words undecipherable] the Soviet government's pursuit to create Russia's national well-being, I've decided to dedicate my power to serving the Motherland and work for the prosperity of its national eminence under the leadership of the current government.

Ataman Semenov⁴

² Note, however, that S.S. B a l m a s o v, *Beloemigranty na voennoi sluzhbe v Kitae* (Moscow: ZAO Tsentrpoligraf, 2007), p. 323, has argued that Semenov's connections to the Bolsheviks were "more than suspicious." See also pp. 200–201 of Balmasov's account.

³ Dmitrii Antonovich Volkogonov papers, 1887–1995, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

⁴ Volkogonov Papers, Box 29, folder 7 (Appendix 1).

This shows that Semenov had already come to terms with the Soviet regime in 1924, shortly after China and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations⁵.

What contact Semenov may have established with the Soviet government is unknown. It is undisputed, however, that Semenov remained the leader of the émigrés in the Far East and was financially supported by the Japanese throughout the 1920s and 1930s until his detention by the Soviet forces in 1945. In his capacity as the anti-Soviet émigré leader in the Far East, Semenov personally knew prominent Japanese political and military leaders, advised them, and followed Tokyo's political military line. Sometimes he appeared to take the initiative of organizing the forces of Buryatia (under Soviet rule), Inner Mongolia (under Chinese rule), and Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic under Soviet control) against Communism⁶. The Japanese gave him a short-wave radio to follow Soviet affairs closely and report on them⁷. He made numerous public speeches to the émigré community against the Soviet Union, and was instrumental in creating the so-called Bureau of Russian Émigré Affairs in Manchukuo in December 1934. Although the Bureau was created purportedly to unite diverse and quarreling émigré groups (monarchists, "Russian Fascists," Cossacks and Semenov loyalists), it never succeeded in achieving its goal⁸, suggesting that Semenov in fact secretly undermined the Bureau's work. At any rate, throughout the period Moscow often lodged complaints with Japan against "Bandit Semenov"⁹. In a "top secret" letter by Secret Police chief Nikolai I. Ezhov (1895–1940) dated 20 September 1937 against the returnees from China (*Kharbintsy*), Semenov was singled out as one of the most important Japanese agents in the Far East¹⁰. This was Moscow's charade.

The Volkogonov Archive contains three documents concerning Semenov dating to 1935 (at which time he resided in Dalian). In a statement dated 21 (or 24)

⁵ The Semenov affair must have been dealt with in strict confidence. Semenov's name does not appear at all in *Perepiska I.V. Stalina i G.V. Chcherina s polpredom SSSR v Kitae L.M. Karakhanom. Dokumenty. Avgust 1923 g.–1926 g.* (Moscow: Natalis, 2008).

⁶ The Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (National Archives of Japan (JACAR): <http://www.jacar.go.jp> (document preference codes B02030823600, B02030823500, B04012980000 on Semenov's moves to "advance into Mongolia" in 1930).

⁷ Y. Nishihara, *Zenkiroku Harubin tokumu kikan: kantōgun jōhōbu no kiseki* (Tokyo: Mainichi shinpunsha, 1980), p. 129.

⁸ P. Balakshin, *Final v Kitae: vozniknovenie, razvitiie i iccheznovenie beloi emigratsii na Dal'nem Vostoke*, vols. 1 and 2 (Moscow: Gos. publ. ist. b-ka, 2013), vol. 1, pp. 253–254. This book is a reprint of the first edition published in San Francisco in 1958.

⁹ In 1931, Karakhan, to whom Semenov addressed his reconciliation letter in 1924, sent a telegram to his representative in the People's Republic of Mongolia warning against Semenov's possible advance! See *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR*, vol. 14 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1968), p. 538.

¹⁰ GUGB NKVD SSSR, "Zakrytoe pis'mo o terroristicheskoi, diversionnoi i shpionskoi deiatel'nosti iaponskoi agentury is kharbintsev," p. 8 (available at: <http://cdvr.org.ua/node/2604> (accessed 31 July 2014)).

July 1935 type-written on his letterhead (No. 967) and addressed to no one, Semenov wrote:

I hereby declare that I accept the correctness of the policy of the Soviet government in the Far East and I agree, voluntarily, to collaborate fully and unconditionally with the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] in the interest of the future of the peoples of the Far East under the conditions of the [current] political situation in the Far East.
Ataman¹¹

He enclosed this statement in a letter type-written on his personal letterhead (No. 968) on 24 July addressed to Georgii Iosifovich Klerzhe, 1883–1938. Klerzhe had worked with Semenov and Admiral Aleksandr V. Kolchak in Siberia and the Far East during the civil war. Later he edited the Japan-sponsored newspaper *Kharbinskoe vremia*. After a while Klerzhe, long suspected by the émigré community in China as a Soviet agent, was expelled from Harbin by the Japanese authorities. Klerzhe then settled in Shanghai. After the Marco Polo Affair (on 7 July 1937 which led to full-scale war between Japan and China), Klerzhe decided to return to Harbin, but was detained by the Japanese in Dalian. Apparently he was killed by the Japanese or the White Russians under Japanese control¹². In his 24 July 1935 letter to Klerzhe, Semenov wrote:

Much-esteemed Georgii Iosifovich,
I fully entrust you to conduct negotiations in my name, according to my statement enclosed here, which you will hand to the representative of the Soviet government in the Far East whom you know.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, I ask you to accept my assurance of my absolute respect for you and my absolute allegiance.
Ataman¹³

The following day, on 25 July 1935, Semenov wrote in long-hand to Klerzhe on the letterhead of the Yamato Hotel, Dairen:

Dear Georgii Iosifovich,
I ask you to arrange as full and good a contact as possible and to come sooner [than later] to see me in Dalian for further arrangements for our common work.
With friendly regards, Your Semenov¹⁴

¹¹ Volkogonov Papers, Box 29, folder 7 (Appendix 2). He signed the letter “Semenov.”

¹² See B a l a k s h i n, *Final v Kitae*, vol. 1, pp. 331–334. See B a l m a s o v, *Beloemigranty na voennoi sluzhbe v Kitae*, pp. 204, 420, 451, and 497.

¹³ Volkogonov Papers, Box 29, folder 7 (Appendix 3). The letter is signed as “Semenov.” Please note that Semenov wrote his statement and letter using the old Russian orthography, not the simplified Soviet one.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* (Appendix 4).

What followed is unknown. However, it is clear from another document in the Volkogonov archive that Klerzhe was a Soviet agent and that Semenov was officially recruited by the Soviet authorities. The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (secret police) Genrikh G. Iagoda (1891–1938) wrote a “TOP SECRET” memorandum to Stalin on 4 April 1936:

To Secretary of the VKP(b) CC [Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party]
Comrade Stalin:

I attach three genuine documents we received from Ataman Semenov who has agreed to work with us.

As early as 1924 we established contact with Semenov through our agents and received from him the enclosed statement addressed to the Soviet ambassador in China as well as several sizable letters expressing his willingness to work in Mongolia in the interest of the Soviet Union. Several attempts to bring Semenov into our territory “for negotiations” did not succeed.

In January 1935 through our agent, former General Klerzhe who was connected with Semenov, we pursued the same goal and got in contact with him. As a result we received the two letters enclosed here dated 24 July 1935 No. 967 and 968.

There is some ground to assume that Semenov gave us these documents with the knowledge of the Japanese.

Considering that Ataman Semenov is currently the head of the most active group of émigré Cossacks in Manchuria to whom the Japanese have entrusted the organization of 10,000 White soldiers to be operated in Inner Mongolia¹⁵ and that *in formulating his forces, Semenov is attracting the Cossack émigré living in the west [of Manchukuo?], I think it necessary to publish these documents in the émigré and foreign press for the purpose of discrediting Semenov.*

I ask for your instruction.

USSR People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Iagoda¹⁶

Stalin did not approve of Iagoda's proposal, scratching his instruction on Iagoda's memorandum: “In my opinion, it's not worth messing with the shitty man [*Po moemu, ne stoit vozit'sia s nim govnom*]”¹⁷.

* * *

Thanks to Stalin, Semenov's secret life was never disclosed. Is it possible, as Iagoda suspected, that the entire affair disclosed in these documents was

¹⁵ The 1930 plan of Semenov's plan of “advance into Mongolia” was no doubt a reflection of this secret agreement.

¹⁶ Volkogonov Papers, Box 29, folder 7 (Appendix 5). The sentences Stalin underlined are italicized. The documents Iagoda mentioned regarding work in Mongolia are not in the Volkogonov Papers.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Semenov's ruse supported by the Japanese? This is very unlikely. Semenov would not have signed those documents (reproduced in this essay) with his own hand if he had meant to play games with Moscow. As Iagoda noted, the publication of such letters would have totally and instantly discredited Semenov.

Did Semenov actually come to terms with the Soviet regime? Most likely he did. He did not agree to step back into Soviet territory "for negotiations," for he knew well that his security was not guaranteed. In any case he led a comfortable life in China supported by the Japanese¹⁸. This is not to say that he did not see the end to émigré politics. By 1924 all attempts to roll back the Bolsheviks had failed. Semenov traveled to China, Japan, the USA, and Canada, but no country was willing to repeat the military invention of the civil war years. Japan was the most reliable partner, because it clung to the dreams of controlling China and the Soviet Far East (and beyond) in its own imperial interests. Semenov knew Japan and its strategy too well not to know that it was inherently imperialistic: Japan's rhetoric of the liberation of Asia from European colonialism and Soviet communism notwithstanding, its ultimate aim was imperialistic. By 1924 Semenov seems to have made up his mind: the Soviet alternative was better than Japanese imperialism.

Semenov remained a Russian patriot. This much is clear from his 1938 autobiography, published in Harbin under Japanese occupation. Defining his political position as "Russianism" (*Rossizm*), he said:

Russianism – this is a formula that defines a person's belonging to the Russian statehood [*Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo*]. Therefore there can be no question of his being denied or accepted as Russian as long as he is a citizen of the Russian state, just as those belonging to some [human] race cannot deny their belonging to this very race¹⁹.

Thus, according to Semenov, one's belonging to Russia was not something that could be taken away.

Like other anti-Soviet émigrés, Semenov seems to have been persuaded by the argument Moscow used to convert émigrés to the Soviet side: "serving the Soviet government does not mean serving the Third International [Comintern] or some political party but national Russia [*natsional'naiia Rossiia*]"²⁰. In this sense, Semenov was similar to other prominent émigrés such as the leader of Russian

¹⁸ He lived in a large estate, ran a large farm and "lived peacefully." He was paid not only by the Japanese Special Mission in Dalian but by the Japanese-run Southern Manchurian Railway Company as well. See Nishihara, *Zenkiroku Harubin tokumu kikan*, p. 129.

¹⁹ Semenov, *O sebe*, p. 209.

²⁰ This is how Klerzhe, Semenov's link to Moscow, was recruited by Moscow. See Balmasov, *Beloemigranty na voennoi sluzhbe v Kitae*, p. 327.

liberals Pavel N. Miliukov, 1859–1943, and the leader of National Bolshevism Nikolai V. Ustrialov, 1890–1937. Both capitulated to Stalin in defense of the national interests of Russia (not the Soviet Union). In 1935 Ustrialov chose to return from Harbin to the Soviet Union where he was executed two years later as a Japanese spy. Miliukov, like Semenov, chose not to return to the Soviet Union and died in France in 1943²¹. Similarly, another prominent White General Nikolai V. Skoblin, 1893–1937, was recruited into the Soviet Intelligence Service in Paris in 1930. Skoblin and his wife Nadeezhda V. Plevitskaia, 1884–1940, a popular singer, assisted in the abduction by Moscow in Paris of the leader of the Russian General Military Union (ROVS) Evgenii K. Miller, 1867–1939. General Miller was taken to Moscow and killed there. Subsequently, Skoblin was murdered by the order of Moscow, who feared the revelation of his secret service²².

It is now known that Semenov maintained secret contact with Mikhail A. Matkovskii, 1903–1968, one of the major émigré leaders in Harbin²³. The Japanese authorities suspected Matkovskii of being a Soviet agent, and may have tried to use him as a double agent. In August 1945 Matkovskii greeted the Soviet forces when they reached Harbin²⁴. Semenov's contacts in China are now known to have included Aleksandr F. Gushchin, 1881–?, who recruited Semenov's purported handler Klerzhe²⁵. Semenov's clandestine connections with Matkovskii, Gushchin, and others is additional indirect evidence of Semenov's double life.

Japan failed to discover Semenov's conversion and generally remained trustful of him until the very end. His background, believed to be partially Asian, and his past collaboration with Japan had made Semenov a special protégé of Japan's Kwantung Army based in Manchuria²⁶. Japan had long suspected V. S. Slutskii,

²¹ On Ustrialov, see L.A. Bystriantseva, "Mirovozzrenie i obshchestvenno-politicheskaia deiatel'nost' N.B. Ustrialova (1890–1937)," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 2000, no. 5, and on Miliukov, see J.P. Nielsen, *Miliukov i Stalin: o politicheskoi evoliutsii Miliukova v emigratsii (1918–1943)* (Oslo: Universitetet i Oslo, Slavisk-Baltisk Institutt, 1983).

²² See A. Gasparian, *General Skoblin: legenda sovetskoi razvedki* (Moscow: Veche, 2012), pp. 350–58 and Nikita Petrov, "Master individual'nogo terrora: portret Eitingona, kollegi Sudoplatova," *Novaia gazeta*, no. 21 (26 February 2014), p. 16.

²³ Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, vol. 1, p. 269.

²⁴ On Matkovskii, see T. Nakajima, "Manshūkoku hakurojin jimukyoku daisankachō Matokofuski," *Sever* (Osaka, Japan), no. 27 (2011), pp. 21–30.

²⁵ See Balmasov, *Beloemigranty na voennoi sluzhbe v Kitae*, pp. 322–339. On Gushchin, see also Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, pp. 358–364. Gushchin was dispatched by Moscow for the purpose of disorganizing the White military forces in China through the formation of a special (fake) military squad of White forces ("Gushchin Detachment").

²⁶ This did not mean that Semenov always felt trusted by the Japanese who treated Semenov merely as a political and military tool. Certainly he was closely watched by the Japanese. Semenov did not approve of the Germany-Italy-Japan Tripartite Pact of 1940, and Japan regarded Semenov's political

one of Semenov's close associates, of ties to the Soviet authorities. In the spring of 1938 they captured and killed him. Semenov made no attempt to defend Slutskii, probably to protect his own life²⁷.

There were other signs of Semenov's double life as well. As early as 1925 British authorities suspected Semenov of links to Soviet agents in Shanghai. Semenov fled to Tokyo, where he is said to have "had breakfast with the Soviet consul"²⁸. At any rate, Semenov remained a Japanese confidant. He made no plans to return to the Soviet Union where his future, given his past of armed struggle against the Bolsheviks, was unpredictable at best. What appears to be the case is that Semenov continued the pretense of working with the Japanese while actually subverting them from within.

Needless to say, this was an extremely delicate and dangerous game. It is clear, however, that Semenov succeeded: Japan never seems to have doubted his loyalty. This did not mean that Moscow was happy with Semenov's conduct. Certainly, Soviet secret police chief Iagoda was not happy in 1936. Nor was Stalin. In order to protect himself, Semenov sometimes overplayed his hand as leader of the anti-Soviet émigré movement. In March 1943, for example, Semenov sent a telegram to Andrei A. Vlasov, 1901–1946, a decorated Red Army general who turned against Stalin after his surrender to the Germans and organized the "Russian Liberation Army." Vlasov had openly called for Russians to fight against the Soviet regime. In his telegram, Semenov, a "25-year veteran" of the anti-Bolshevik struggle, congratulated Vlasov and wished him success. The telegram was published on the pages of *Kharbinskoe vremia* on 7 May 1943²⁹. This act may have led some in Moscow to believe that Semenov was playing a game dictated by the Japanese. However, this particular act of Semenov in 1943 was definitely *not* dictated by the Japanese. With increasingly dim prospects in the war against the United States and the Allies, Japan sought not to irritate the Soviet Union and even curtailed anti-Soviet organizations at the time³⁰. This and other actions taken by Semenov in fact served Moscow's political purpose. Japan was portrayed as continuing to hatch nefarious schemes using the Russian émigrés against the Soviet Union.

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acumen as no longer sharp after many years in emigration. See B a l a k s h i n, *Final v Kitae*, vol. 1, pp. 397, 403, 413–415, and N i s h i h a r a, *Zenkiroku Harubin tokumu kikan*, p. 129.

²⁷ See B a l a k s h i n, *Final v Kitae*, vol. 1, pp. 330 and 340. Balakshin disagreed that Slutskii was a Soviet agent.

²⁸ B a l m a s o v, *Beloemigranty na voennoi sluzhbe v Kitae*, pp. 322–323.

²⁹ JACAR, B02032147900. See also J. J. S t e p h a n, *The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 319.

³⁰ See S t e p h a n, *The Russian Fascists*, pp. 320.

It is not at all surprising that Stalin did not trust Semenov even after the latter pledged loyalty to the Soviet regime. Stalin did not trust his own loyal servants. During the Great Terror of 1937–1938 Stalin repressed 275 (or 68 percent) of 450 Soviet foreign intelligence officials in Moscow and abroad³¹. Not trusting even Richard Sorge, a Moscow spy in Tokyo who had planted his agents deep in the Japanese establishment and had sent Moscow valuable intelligence, Stalin recalled him to Moscow in the autumn of 1937. Sorge, however, refused to return and survived, only to be caught in 1941, and hanged three years later by the Japanese in Tokyo³². It was only after Stalin's death that Sorge came to be celebrated in the Soviet Union.

Stalin was not happy with Semenov. Yet Stalin's response to Iagoda's memorandum of 1936, quoted above, shows clearly that Stalin still saw some political use for Semenov, "the shitty man."

It is difficult to assess precisely how much contribution Semenov made to the Soviet Union. A protégé of the Kwantung Army, Semenov was familiar with top-secret information about Japan's military plans. One can safely conclude that almost all important moves the Japanese military forces planned between 1924 and 1945 must have been known to Moscow. Even if Moscow treated Semenov's information with distrust, it was able to verify it against the intelligence supplied by many other Soviet agents (such as Matkovskii) in Manchuria and Japan³³. In this sense, almost certainly Semenov rendered inestimably great service to Moscow.

Nevertheless, Semenov was arrested and executed by Stalin. This is not at all surprising. Semenov was no longer useful when Japan was defeated. Just as Stalin executed his loyal followers (including the secret police chief Iagoda and his successor Ezhov) when they became no longer useful, Stalin executed Semenov. The more secrets one knew, the worse one's fate became under Stalin³⁴. By all indications, Semenov was wrongly optimistic about his fate when Japan was defeated in August 1945. In public, Semenov deplored Japan's unconditional surrender and even shed tears over it, according to Japanese witnesses. Even though Japan provided him with the means to flee from Dalian, he believed that

³¹ See I. A. D a m a s k i n, (2004) *Stalin i razvedka* (Moscow: Veche, 2004), p. 205.

³² S. K o b a y a s h i (eds.), *Zorge ha naze shikei ni saretanoka: "kokusai supai jiken" no shinsō* (Tokyo: Shakai hyōron sha, 2000).

³³ In the summer of 1937 the Japanese government estimated that there were approximately 2,000 "clear [Soviet] spies" in Japan and Manchu-kuo as well as 50,000 "conscious and unconscious Soviet agents." Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryō Kan (Tokyo), S.9.4.5.

³⁴ Matkovskii helped the Soviet forces in Harbin, acquired Soviet citizenship and returned to the Soviet Union in August 19346. Then he was arrested and sentenced to 25 years in the Gulag. Released in 1959, he died in 1968 in the Soviet. See N a k a j i m a, "Manshūkoku," pp. 27–29.

he would not be arrested by the Soviets³⁵. Many different versions exist of the circumstances under which Semenov was arrested by the Soviet forces in Dalian on 22 August 1945 and removed to Soviet territory. According to one testimony, Semenov willingly returned to the Soviet Union and dreamed of “serving the motherland as much as he could”³⁶.

Needless to say, Semenov’s calculations proved wrong. His service to the Soviet Union did not save him. Quite likely, he was promised, like other émigré leaders from Manchuria such as the leader of the Russian Fascist Party, Konstantin V. Rodzaevskii, 1907–1946, leniency in exchange for frank confessions of guilt. Unlike Semenov, Rodzaevskii tried to flee the invading Soviet forces but was caught. Detained, Rodzaevskii is said to have made a complete about-face, extolling the Soviet Union and its leader and professing himself a “true Stalinist”³⁷. Of course, this report may have been Soviet propaganda to discredit him and disarm his followers.

In August 1946 Semenov was tried in Moscow along with seven other émigré leaders from the Far East (including Rodzaevskii and Boris N. Shepunov, 1897–1946, a monarchist). The court was presided over Vasilii V. Ul’rikh, 1889–1951, a notorious judge who sent many of the Old Bolsheviks to death in the 1930s. Unlike similar trials of Vlasov and his supporters and émigré Cossack leaders in Europe such as Andrei G. Shkuro, 1887–1947, and Petr N. Krasnov, 1869–1947 that took place at that time, the trial of Semenov and his co-defendants was given wide coverage in the Soviet press and on the Soviet radio. This is significant. Stalin appears to have wanted to ensure that Semenov was known by the world as a Japanese spy who had fought bitterly against the Soviet Union. An “open court” was the best forum for Semenov to incriminate himself. The outcome would be reported to the world by the Western press. An open court would further protect the secret of Semenov’s double life. Indeed, according to the Soviet press, all defendants, including Semenov, pleaded guilty to the charges of espionage for Japan and anti-Soviet activity (sabotage, terrorism and the like). Every defendant willingly exposed the dark schemes and activities of the now defeated Japan against the Soviet Union.

The trial was duly reported not merely by the Soviet but the Western press as well, including *The New York Times*. In the 1946 article entitled “When America Saved Siberia,” the *Times* reminded American readers of the sins of Semenov dating back to the time of the American military intervention in Siberia during the Russian civil war of 1918–1920. The United States dispatched its forces to

³⁵ See Nishihara, *Zenkiroku Harubin tokumu kikan*, p. 130.

³⁶ Quoted in Balakshin, *Final v Kitae*, vol. 2, pp. 173–174.

³⁷ See Stephan, *The Russian Fascists*, pp. 337–340.

Siberia mainly in order to thwart Japan's territorial and economic ambitions in the Russian Far East. Semenov, supported by Japan, stood in the way. In the end, Japan failed in its ambitions thanks in part to the presence of US forces (which mostly stayed out of the war against the Bolsheviks). Readers were reminded that when Semenov traveled to the USA in 1922, he was arrested and charged with the murders of local civilians and American soldiers committed by his military forces in Siberia during the Russian civil war. Semenov appeared to have jumped bail and fled from the United States³⁸. Of the Semenov trial in Moscow, the *New York Times* declared: "We already knew that he was a terrorist, a butcher and a Japanese agent... there was no need to doubt him when he said in Moscow on Tuesday [27 August 1946] he had plotted with them [the Japanese] for twenty-five years against the Soviet Government." The *Times* added, "in condemning Semenov, as we do, too, the Russians might consistently acknowledge this one debt of gratitude to the United States and to the memory of General Graves, who died in 1940"³⁹. The trial thus proved to be a brilliant example of Stalinist propaganda and disinformation at home and abroad.

In spite of his plea for clemency, Semenov was sentenced to death by hanging as "the most vicious enemy of the Soviet people and the most active accomplice of the Japanese aggressors." Five others, including Rodzaevskii and Shepunov, were sentenced to be shot. Semenov was hanged immediately after the verdict was announced, on 30 August 1946⁴⁰.

Stalin made sure that Semenov took his secrets to the grave. One suspects that further evidence of his secret life lies in his personal files stored in the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in Moscow. At least one person, "Vadim Sotskov," has had access to the Semenov file consisting of 29 volumes⁴¹. Unfortunately, Sotskov's subsequent article on the file is uninformative at best. Sotskov appears not to have read the file carefully, or ignored Semenov's secret life as an inconvenient historical fact, or was not allowed to publish his findings. When the Volkogonov papers were handed over by his family to the United States

³⁸ See Bisher, *White Terror*, pp. 289–292. See also Semenov *O sebe*, part 2, ch. 10.

³⁹ *The New York Times*, 29 August 1946, p. 19. General William S. Graves, 1865–1940, supervised some 8,000 US soldiers sent to Siberia. He wrote a book about his experience and denounced Semenov (a "bandit" and "murderer") and his "anti-Americanism." (See W.S. Graves, *America's Siberian Adventure, 1918–1920* (New York: Peter Smith, 1941). For a somewhat more detached report on the Semenov trial, see *Times* (London, England), 28 August 1946, p. 3 and 31 August 1946, p. 3.

⁴⁰ *Pravda*, 30 August 1946, p. 3 and 31 August 1946, p. 4. See also *The New York Times*, 31 August 1946, p. 4.

⁴¹ V. Sotskov, "General i Ataman (Sud'ba generala SEMENOVA po materialam Tsentral'nogo Arkhiva FSB)," *Zavtra*, 9 January 2001 (See <http://zavtra.ru/content/2001-01-0951>, accessed 29 August 2014).

Library of Congress in the late 1990s, the FSB may have become nervous and thus granted Sotskov special access to the Semenov file in the FSB Archive. The resulting silence in Sotskov's article on Semenov's collaboration with Moscow seems a clever obfuscatory ploy to divert the attention of credible scholars searching for historical truth. This may explain why the FSB still posts Sotskov's convenient article, published in 2001, on its web sites⁴².

Some may find it difficult to imagine that the prominent anti-Soviet émigré leader, Ataman Semenov, was a Soviet agent. In fact, this is hardly surprising. In his efforts to convince an incredulous Soviet population that his archenemy Trotskii and many others were capitalist agents, Stalin declared: "[T]here is nothing surprising in human life" (*[N]ichego udivitel'nogo net v chelovecheskoi zhizni*)⁴³. Stalin's remark surely reflects his political operations with Semenov whereby Semenov (and some other "anti-Soviet" émigré leaders) played into Stalin's hand and ended up executed. Meanwhile, Moscow had obtained through Semenov uncalculable military and diplomatic advantage over Japan, its main rival in Asia.

There is much rewriting to be done on the history of the Stalin era. The history of Semenov, the White Movement, and Soviet espionage and counter-espionage in Asia in the 1920, 1930s, and 1940s deserve significant attention and revision.



PRZEGLĄD
WSCHODNI

⁴² See: <http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/history/author/single.html?id%3D10318142@fsbPublication.html>, accessed 29 August 2014.

⁴³ *Voprosy istorii*, 1992, nos. 4–5, p. 36.

APPENDIX

72-2

Товарищ С.С. Каракхану
Копия

Спасибо тебе,
за твои труды по созданию
нашего движения. Ты сделал
нам много добра, особенно
в то время, когда мы были
в ссылке. Ты помог нам
связаться с другими
товарищами. Ты помог нам
создать комитет. Ты помог
нам выжить. Ты помог нам
создать нашу организацию.
Ты помог нам выжить в
ссылке. Ты помог нам
создать нашу организацию.
Ты помог нам выжить в
ссылке. Ты помог нам
создать нашу организацию.

Семён Семёнович
Семёнов

1924 г. ноябрь 21
Москва

APPENDIX I: Semenov's letter to L.M. Karakhan (21 November 1924)

72.

Атаманъ СЕМЕНОВЪ

21. Июля 1935 г.

№ 967.

г. Даяренъ

Признавалъ правильность курса политики Правительство
Советскаго Союза на Дальнемъ Востоке, въ интересахъ будущаго
нации, населяющей его территорію, настоящимъ являю о ово-
емъ соглашеніи добровольно принять на себя сотрудничество от
СССР въ полной и безоговорочной мѣрѣ въ условіяхъ политиче-
ской обстановки на Дальнемъ Востоке.

АТАМАНЪ



Атаманъ СЕМЕНОВЪ

24. Июля 1935 г.

№ 968

г. Дайронъ

Г. И. Клерже,

Дайронъ.

Глубокоуважаемый Георгій Іосифовичъ.

Я поощряю довѣрью Вамъ рости отъ моего имени переговоры, ооглавно предлагаемые къ оску моего влывленія, которое Вы дру-чито извѣстному Вамъ предопителю Правительства СССР на Даль-нисиъ Востокаъ.

Пользуясь настоящимъ случаемъ, прошу Васъ принять мои увѣренія въ совершенномъ уваженіи къ Вамъ и таковой-же про-двизности.

АТАМАНЪ



72-7

CABLE ADDRESS "YAMATO"

THE YAMATO HOTEL

DAIREN

Owned & Operated by S.M.R.

CHECKS CASH RECEIPTS

THE YAMATO HOTEL RECEIPTS

THE YAMATO HOTEL RECEIPTS

THE YAMATO HOTEL RECEIPTS

THE YAMATO HOTEL RECEIPTS

THE YAMATO HOTEL RECEIPTS

1935
7/25

Дорогой Леопольд Иванович,
 Спасибо Вам за мое письмо
 от 21 июля и за Ваше письмо
 от 24 июля и за Ваше письмо
 от 25 июля и за Ваше письмо
 от 26 июля. В Дairen все
 идет нормально. С наилучшими
 со мной остается семья.
 С уважением к Вам
 Семья Семья Семья

APPENDIX 4: Semenov's letter to Klerzhe (24 July 1935)

42-а

СОБРЕМЕННО СЕКРЕТНО

СЕКРЕТАРЮ ЦК ВКП(б)
Тов. СТАЛИНУ. -

Прилагаю при сем три подлинных документа, полученные нами от атаман Семёнова с выражением согласия сотрудничать с нами.

Еще в 1934 г. мы через нашу агентуру установили с Семёновым контакт и получили от него прилагаемое заявление на имя посла СССР в Китае, а также несколько пространных писем с выражением готовности действовать в Монголии в интересах СССР. Несколько попыток привлечь Семёнова на нашу территорию для переговоров не дали результатов.

В январе 1935 г. через нашего агента, бива-генерала КИРПЕС, связанного с Семёновым, мы ставя перед собой ту же задачу, снова связались с ним. В результате были получены прилагаемые два документа от 24 июня 1935 г. № 967 и 968.

Есть основание предполагать, что Семёнов выдал нам эти документы с подачи японцев.

Учитывая, что атаман Семёнов в настоящее время является главой наиболее активной части эмигрантско-

Атаманъ СЕМЕНОВЪ

24 Июля 1935 г.

№ 968

г. Дайрэнъ

Г. И. Кларко,

Дайрэнъ.

Глубокоуважаемый Георгій Ивановичъ.

Я послѣ доверья Вамъ рости отъ моего имени переговоров, ооглапо предлагаемого къ оску моего ваявлешя, которое Вы вручили извѣтному Вамъ представителю Правительства СССР на Дальнемъ Востоке.

Пользуясь настоящим случаемъ, прошу Васъ принять мои увѣренія въ совершенномъ уваженіи къ Вамъ и таковой-же продуктивности.

АТАМАНЪ



STRESZCZENIE

Hiroaki KUROMIYA, *Sekretne życie atamana Siemionowa*

Ataman Grigorij Michajłowicz Siemionow (1890–1946) był znanym zabajkalskim przywódcą Kozaków. Zgodnie z oficjalną wersją jego historii, nie chcąc zaakceptować zwycięstwa Rewolucji Październikowej, wyemigrował do Chin, gdzie zaczął współpracować z rządem japońskim. Ataman Siemionow był powszechnie postrzegany jako czołowy przedstawiciel liczonej w dziesiątkach tysięcy rosyjskiej emigracji oraz Białego Ruchu (aktywistów antysowieckich) na Dalekim Wschodzie. Wraz z końcem II wojny światowej, gdy Moskwa wypowiedziała wojnę Japonii, Siemionow został pojmany przez wkraczające do Mandżurii siły sowieckie, a następnie zabrany do Związku Radzieckiego, gdzie został postawiony przed sądem i powieszony.

Najnowsze dowody wskazują jednak, że już w 1924 r. Siemionow porozumiał się z sowieckim rządem i począwszy od połowy lat 30. współpracował z Moskwą. Z dużym prawdopodobieństwem można powiedzieć, że Siemionow był nie, jak opisuje to większość literatury, emigracyjnym przywódcą ruchów anty-sowieckich, lecz sowieckim agentem. Dowody na powyższą tezę można znaleźć w licznych dokumentach przechowywanych w Archiwum Dmitrija A. Wołkogonowa w Bibliotece Kongresu Stanów Zjednoczonych w Waszyngtonie. Wołkogonow, wysokiej rangi wojskowy, miał możliwość korzystania z wcześniej niedostępnych archiwów (w tym NKWD). Szczęśliwie dla historyków, dokumenty które zebrał przed swoją śmiercią w 1995 r. trafiły do Biblioteki Kongresu, gdzie każdy zainteresowany może je przeglądać.

Pierwszym z dokumentów sporządzonych ręką Siemionowa, jest datowany na 21 listopada 1924 r. list do ówczesnego ambasadora ZSRR Lwa M. Karachana (1889–1937). Siemionow wyrażał w nim akceptację dla radzieckiego rządu zaraz po tym, jak Chiny i ZSRR nawiązały relacje dyplomatyczne: „Zdecydowałem się poświęcić moje siły, by służyć Ojczyźnie [Rosji radzieckiej] i pracować dla pomyślności jej narodowej chwały pod przewodnictwem obecnego [radzieckiego] rządu”.

W datowanym na 1935 r. drugim dokumencie pochodzącym z Archiwum Wołkogonowa, Siemionow otwarcie deklaruje, że „zaakceptował słuszność polityki rządu radzieckiego na Dalekim Wschodzie” oraz, że będzie „w pełni i bezwarunkowo współpracował z ZSRR”.

Trzeci dokument, również datowany na 1935 r., zaadresowany jest do Georgija Klerzhe (1883–1838), który nadzorował Siemionowa w Chinach, a podczas wojny domowej współpracował z Siemionowem oraz admirałem Aleksandrem Kołczakiem. W liście tym Siemionow zwraca się do Klerzhe'go z prośbą, by ten „przyjął zapewnienia o absolutnym szacunku i lojalności”. W kolejnym dokumencie Siemionow doprasza się o „jak najpełniejsze i jak najlepsze zorganizowanie kontaktu”. Ostatni z dokumentów, datowany na 4 kwietnia 1936 r., zawiera wymianę zdań pomiędzy szefem NKWD – Gienrichem Jagodą (1891–1938) – a Józefem Stalinem. Z nieznanych powodów Moskwa nie była zadowolona z pracy Siemionowa i wyrażała podejrzenia, że pod przykrywką współpracy z nimi, w rzeczywistości pracuje dla Japończyków. W memorandum do Stalina, Jagoda załączył podpisane przez Siemionowa dokumenty oraz zaproponował, by zdyskredytować go w oczach środowisk emigracyjnych poprzez celowe ujawnienie jego współpracy z Moskwą: „Biorąc pod uwagę, że ataman Siemionow stoi obecnie na czele najbardziej aktywnej emigracyjnej grupy kozaków w Mandżurii, której Japończycy powierzyli dowodzenie 10 000 żołnierzy Białego Ruchu w Mongolii Wewnętrznej oraz że poprzez formowanie swoich sił Siemionow przyciąga kozackich emigrantów żyjących na zachód [od Mandżukuo], sądzę że koniecznością staje się opublikowanie tych dokumentów w prasie emigranckiej i zagranicznej, w celu zdyskredytowania Siemionowa”.

Stalin jednakże nie przystał na propozycję Jagody i stwierdził: „Według mnie, nie należy zajmować się tym głównem [По-моему, не стоит возиться с этим говном]”. Najwyraźniej Stalin uważał, że może ono w pewnym momencie okazać się politycznie przydatne i rzeczywiście, dowody wskazują, że Siemionow oddał Moskwie niezrównane przysługi.

Jednakże, bez względu na swoje zasługi, Siemionow został pojmany w 1945 r. w Chinach, a w 1946 r. osądzony i stracony w Moskwie. ZSRR zdecydował się na ten krok by ukryć sekretną działalność Siemionowa. On sam, jak się zdaje, nie wykonał żadnego ruchu by uciec. Jego proces był szeroko relacjonowany zarówno przez prasę radziecką, jak i zagraniczną. Siemionow, spodziewając się najwyraźniej łagodniejszego traktowania, jeśli przyzna się do zarzucanych mu win, poszedł drogą często wytyczaną przed wieloma innymi skazanymi na śmierć za czasów Stalina

i ukazał siebie jako jedną z głównych postaci spośród przywódców ruchu antysowieckiego oraz szpiegów japońskich. Prasa, zarówno radziecka jak i zagraniczna, nie kwestionując oskarżeń, przyjęła je jako uzasadnione. Sam proces okazał się znakomitym przykładem stalinowskiej propagandy oraz dezinformacji w kraju i zagranicą. Tym samym, dzięki egzekucji, Stalinowi udało się na zawsze ukryć sekretne życie Siemionowa.

Obecnie jednak, dzięki Archiwum Wołkogonowa, ów dawno pogrzebany sekret na nowo budzi się do życia. Szczegóły współpracy atamana z Moskwą są nadal nieznanne i raczej takie pozostaną, chyba że archiwa NKWD udostępnią badaczom osobiste akta Siemionowa. Rzeczywistość wydaje się jednak od tego odległa, gdyż Moskwa ze wszelkich sił stara się ukryć sekretne życie atamana Siemionowa. Gdy w późnych latach 90. papiery Wołkogonowa zostały przekazane przez jego rodzinę Bibliotece Kongresu, wywołało to duży niepokój w FSB. W efekcie przydzielono starannie wybraną osobę („Wadim Sotskow”), która otrzymała dostęp specjalny do aktów Siemionowa. W powstałym w efekcie artykule Sotskova, nic nie zostało napisane na temat współpracy Siemionowa z Moskwą, co wydaje się celową taktyką, mającą na celu odwrócić uwagę od wiarygodnych badaczy poszukujących prawdy historycznej.

Siemionow pozostał rosyjskim patriotą, który wierzył, że przynależenie do tego kraju jest czymś, czego nie można komuś odebrać. Jak wielu innych antysowieckich emigrantów, Siemionow najprawdopodobniej został przekonany często stosowanym przez Moskwę argumentem, że: „służenie władzy radzieckiej nie oznacza służenie III Międzynarodówce [Kominternowi] lub jakiejś partii politycznej, lecz Rosji narodowej [„национальная Россия”]”. Japonii nie udało się odkryć, że Siemionow zmienił strony i zasadniczo ufano mu aż do końca. Mówiono o jego częściowo azjatyckim pochodzeniu, a jego wcześniejsza współpraca z Japonią czyniła go szczególnie protegowanym japońskiej Armii Kwantuńskiej stacjonującej w Mandżurii.

Jeżeli Siemionow rzeczywiście był radzieckim agentem, oznacza to, że Moskwa posiadała pełną wiedzę na temat większości strategicznych przedsięwzięć cesarskiej Japonii. Wskazuje to również na to, że historia epoki stalinowskiej powinna w dużym stopniu zostać napisana od nowa.

SANTRAUKA

Hiroaki KUROMIYA, *Ataman Semenov slaptas gyvenimas*

Atamanas Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov, 1890–1946, yra gerai žinomas Užbaikalės Kazokų lyderis. Remiantis oficialiais duomenimis jis atsisakė pripažinti 1917 m. Bolševikų revoliuciją ir emigravo į Kiniją, kur buvo įdarbintas Japonijos vyriausybės. Ataman Semenov buvo plačiai pripažintas kaip Rusijos emigracinės bendruomenės ir Baltųjų (antisovietiška nusiteikusių) žmonių lyderis Toluosiuose Rytuose. Baigiantis Antrajam Pasauliniam karui, kuomet Maskva paskelbė karą Japonijai, Simenov buvo sugautas tarybinės armijos Mandžūrijoje, nugabentas į TSRS, nuvestas ir pakartas Maskvoje.

Tačiau neseniai atrasti duomenys rodo, jog Semenov palaikė ryšius su Tarybų vyriausybe nuo 1924 m. ir pradėjo jai dirbti nuo trečio dešimtmečio vidurio. Atrodo, jog Semionov buvo sovietų agentas, o ne antisovietinės emigracijos lyderis, kaip teigia beveik visa istoriografija. Tokią prielaidą leidžia daryti keletas dokumentų saugomų Dimitrij A.Volkogonov archyve USA Kongreso bibliotekoje.

Dabar jo slaptas gyvenimas buvo paviešintas remiantis Volkogonov archyvu. Jei Simenov iš tikrųjų buvo sovietų agentas, tai reiškė jog Maskva puikiai žinojo apie visus svarbius Japonijos imperijos strateginius ėjimus. Tai reiškia, jog daug istorijos, susijusios su Stalino era turi būti perrašyta.

РЭЗЮМЭ

Хіроакі КУРОМІЯ, *Сакрэтнае жыццё атамана Сямёнава*

Атаман Грыгоры Міхайлавіч Сямёнаў, 1890–1946, добра вядомы як правадыр байкальскіх казакоў. Згодна афіцыйнай гісторыі, ён адмовіўся прыняць перамогу бальшавіцкай рэвалюцыі

кастрычніка 1917 году і эміграваў у Кітай, дзе быў працаўладкаваны японскім ўрадам. Атамана Сямёнава лічылі кіраўніком расейскай эміграцыйнай супольнасці і Беллага (антысавецкага) руху на Далёкім Усходзе. Пад канец II Сусветнай вайны, калі Масква абвясціла Японію вайну, Сямёнава захапілі савецкія войскі, якія пачалі наступленне ў Маньчжурый, пасля чаго ён быў перавезены ў Савецкі Саюз, асуджаны і павешаны ў Маскве.

Аднак найноўшыя доказы сьведчаць, што Сямёнаў паразумеўся з савецкім урадам ужо ў 1924 годзе і пачаў працаваць на Маскву з сярэдзіны 30-х гадоў XX ст. Можна быць Сямёнаў зьяўляўся савецкім агентам, а не правадыром антысавецкай эміграцыі, як сьцьвярджае амаль уся літаратура. Гэтыя дадзеныя знаходзяцца ў некалькіх дакумэнтах, што захоўваюцца ў Архіве Дзьмітрыя Валкагонова Бібліятэкі Кангрэсу ЗША.

Цяпер, дзякуючы архіву Валкагонова, на яго сакрэтнае жыццё было пралітае святло. Калі Сямёнаў сапраўды быў савецкім агентам – гэта азначала, што Масква была добра інфармавана аб кожным руху імперскай Японіі. І гэта таксама значыць, што гісторыяграфія сталінскіх часоў патрабуе дэталёвай перапрацоўкі.

РЕЗЮМЕ

Хіроакі КУРОМІЯ, *Таёмне жытця атамана Семенова*

Атаман Григорій Михайлович Семенов, 1890–1946 рр., ё добра вядомым лідерам Байкальскіх козакаў. Згідна з офіцыйною версіяю, він відмовіўся прыняці ўспіх більшовіцкай рэвалюцыі ў жовтні 1917 року і емігрував до Китаю, де він співпрацовав з японскім урадам. Атаман Семенов був широко відомий як голова російської еміграції і Білого руху (антирадянського) на Далёкому Сході. До кінца Другой сьветовой вайны, коли Москва оголосила вайну Японіі, Семенов був спійманий під час вторгнення радянскіх войск у Маньчжурію, його доставили в Радянскій Союз, судили і повісили в Москві

Останні дані, проте, показують, що Семенов прійшов до угоди з радянскім урадам ще в 1924 році і що він почав працоваці на Маскву з сярэдзіны 1930-х років. Семенов, здавалася б, був радянскім агентом, а не антирадянскім лідерам емігрантв, оскількі майже вся історична літаратура це підтверджуе. Ці свідчення можна знаціти в декількох документах, що знаходяться в Архіві Дмитра А. Волкогонова в Бібліотеці Конгресу США.

Тепер, однак, його таёмне жытця було розкрите завдякі архіву Волкогонова. Якщо Семенов був дійсно радянскім агентом, це означае, що Москва була повністю проінформована майже про всі важліві стратэгічні крокі імператорскай Японіі. Це також означае, що слід багата праць перепісати з історіі «вуха Сталіна».

РЕЗЮМЕ

Хироаки КУРОМІЯ, *Тайная жизнь атамана Семенова*

Атаман Григорій Михайлович Семенов, 1890–1946, является хорошо известным лидером Байкальских казаков. По официальной версии, он отказался принять успех большевистской революции в октябре 1917 года и эмигрировал в Китай, где он работал на японское правительство. Атаман Семенов был широко известен как главарь русской эмиграции и Белого движения (антисоветского) на Дальнем Востоке. К концу Второй мировой войны, когда Москва объявила войну Японии, Семенов был пойман во время вторжения советских войск в Маньчжурю, его доставили в Советский Союз, судили и повесили в Москве.

Последние данные, однако, показывают, что Семенов пришел к соглашению с советским правительством еще в 1924 году и что он начал работать на Москву с середины 1930-х годов. Семенов, казалось бы, был советским агентом, а не антисоветским лидером эмигрантом, так как почти вся историческая литература утверждает. Это свидетельство можно найти в нескольких документах в Архиве Дмитрия А. Волкогонова в Библиотеки Конгресса США.

Теперь, однако, его тайная жизнь была развинчена благодаря архиву Волкогонова. Если Семенов был действительно советским агентом, это означает, что в Москве знали почти все о важных стратегических шагах императорской Японии. Это также означает, что надо будет много переписать в связи с историей «уха Сталина».